

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA VISION 2050



BY PATRICK KAIKU

Cover imagery:

1. Land is integral to the survival of rural communities but Vision 2050 promotes land alienation (photo: Greenpeace)
2. Vision 2050 fails to provide a road map for a prosperous future for all Papua New Guineans
3. Women sorting coffee beans in Goroka illustrate the sort of economy PNG needs to foster
4. We can provide a happy future for our children if we trust in and promote of our own PNG Ways (photo: Laura Tamakoshi)

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Report commissioned by ACT NOW!

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BSO – Basic Social Obligations

DPM&NEC – Department of Prime Minister and National Executive Council

GoPNG – Government of Papua New Guinea

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

HDI – Human Development Index

LLGs – Local-level Governments

LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas

LTDS – Long Term Development Strategy

MDG – Millennium Development Goal

MTDS – Term Development Strategy

NADP – National Agriculture Development Plan

NEC – National Executive Council

NGDPs – National Goals and Directive Principles

NPC – National Planning Committee

NPEP – National Public Expenditure Plan

NSPT – National Strategic Plan Taskforce

PNG – Papua New Guinea

SABLS – Special Agriculture Business Leases

SPC – Secretariat of the Pacific Community

TORs – Terms of Reference

UN – United Nations

UPNG – University of Papua New Guinea

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is becoming common practice for policy-makers to cite the National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDPs)¹ as guiding principles in their writing up of policy directives, national plans or other such documents of public significance. But do these national policy documents actually reflect the intentions of the NGDPs? The use of the NGDPs in national policy documents is a convenient way of invoking a semblance of legitimacy and authoritativeness, especially when the government claims to conduct its affairs on behalf of the people.

In this analysis, we critically examine the PNG Vision 2050 with the objective of demonstrating its consistency with the NGDPs. In the PNG Vision 2050, the NGDPs are made reference to no less than seven (7) times. No doubt the writers of the PNG Vision 2050 sought to reinforce the legitimacy of the Vision 2050 by aligning its intentions to that of the NGDPs. But are the development strategies proposed in the PNG Vision 2050 consistent with the spirit of the NGDPs?

This analysis contributes to the national discussions about the role of the timeless NGDPs as the basis of PNG's national development aspirations. After all, the Constitutional Planning Committee intended that the NGDPs guide national decision-making and development thinking in post-Independence PNG.

This current analysis was undertaken for Act Now! and the project's TOR established the parameters of the study. The primary focus of the project was to provide a critical comparative analysis of the Vision 2050 and its compatibility with PNG's National Goals and Directive Principles. To enable this analysis, the TOR was framed as follows:

1. Provide a brief of the PNG Vision 2050 in its current form; and
2. Do a comparative analysis of the PNG Vision 2050 and the National Goals and Directive Principles in the Preamble of the PNG Constitution, in particular the questions:
 - 2.1 Are our home grown National Goals # 1-5 of the PNG Constitution reflected in the PNG Vision 2050? ; and
 - 2.2 To what extent are our home grown National Goals # 1 to 5 and the subsequent Directive Principles of the PNG Constitution captured in the PNG Vision 2050?

The consultant employed the assistance of a political science graduate from the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG); Mr. Neles Tandamat. The analysis involved a desktop review of the Vision 2050 and the Constitutional Planning Committee's Final Report. Reading of the Vision 2050 and the Constitutional Planning Committee Report was complemented with additional literature relevant to development in PNG, and by extension Melanesia. We also consulted

¹ The 5 NGDPs are:

- Integral Human Development;
- Equality and Participation;
- National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance;
- Natural Resources, Resource Creation and Environment; and Papua New Guinean Ways.

materials from the World Wide Web in our research. The availability of updated and current materials on the internet provided us with useful information for comparative purposes.

The draft report was submitted to Act Now! From the discussions and the feedback provided the follow up verifications were done and the final draft of this report was presented.

Key findings:

- The expressed intentions of the NGDPs and the visionary thinking of the Constitutional Planning Committee are grossly misinterpreted in the Vision 2050. An example of this is seen in the land reform strategies employed by the Vision 2050. The safeguarding of PNG's traditional land tenure system is disregarded as concerted efforts at freeing up the land is espoused in the Vision 2050. As the experience with the current Special Agriculture Business Leases (SABLs) demonstrates, this unregulated exercise will compromise the economic sovereignty and spirit of self-reliance in a predominantly agrarian PNG setting. Further marginalization of Papua New Guineans from their land and associated stress on cultural resilience will be undermined if the trend continues;
- In the Vision 2050, PNG is expected to work towards attaining "middle income country status" and be situated in the top 50 of the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking" by the year 2050. These yardsticks do not reflect Papua New Guinean lived realities as envisaged by the Constitutional Planning Committee. PNG is predominantly a rural society where communal identities are still vibrant. Any abrupt changes to the communal elements of PNG society and utilization of their communal land must be progressive and be considerate of the dignity and economic sovereignty of Papua New Guineans. We believe that the Vision 2050's use of global development yardsticks is a disempowering exercise. It disregards alternative indigenous Melanesian definitions of "development" and individual well-being;
- An export-oriented approach, with the strategies that promote outward expansion at the expense of consolidation of local ownership of the economy of PNG is detrimental to the political sovereignty of PNG. The Vision 2050 is facilitating a potentially disastrous economic model of development that will see local entrepreneurial capacity inhibited;
- The role of cultural education and the benefits of culture as tools for development are omitted from any practical strategic considerations in the Vision 2050. For an agrarian society such as PNG, steeped in its cultural heritage, the Vision 2050 does not factor this aspect of PNG into development priorities;
- Though equalization and broad-based development is suggested in the Vision 2050, the phasing out of the extreme dependence on the mining sector does not have a specific time frame. We hold the view that the mining sector will continue to compromise the political sovereignty of PNG as long as there are no specific attempts to promptly disengage the mining sector in the economic modelling in PNG. Agriculture must be promoted as a stand-alone sector that must be the front-line sector for true economic and political sovereignty;

- The Vision 2050 is not sustainable and will not authoritatively become the “philosophy of life” in PNG given that it suffers from a lack of legitimacy and institutionalization. The process to create enabling legislations and make it an appealing development blue-print over the 40-year duration is reason enough to question its longevity, and;
- A revisitation of the NGDPs must be undertaken as a matter of national priority. The content of PNG’s education curriculum must be enriched with the NGDPs to ingrain at an early age the principles and values that should be activated for national development. The failure of all sectors of PNG to incorporate the NGDPs into the national life of society is the obvious reason why the NGDPs are deliberately misinterpreted in the Vision 2050. An informed citizenry can play a proactive role in critiquing the Vision 2050 against their own understanding of the NGDPs.

BACKGROUND

In August 1974, Papua New Guinea's Constitutional Planning Committee completed one of the most comprehensive exercises yet, in nation-wide consultations. The Constitutional Planning Committee had specific Terms of References (TOR) to undertake the process of consultations,² but was also given unlimited powers beyond the TOR³ to consult as widely as they could.

The terms of reference for the consultative process were announced by the then Chief Minister Michael Somare two years earlier (on the 23rd of June 1972). During its fact-finding mission, the Constitutional Planning Committee carried out consultations that included an estimated 500 discussion groups and public meetings attended by more than 60,000 people. What came out of this national process was a detailed Report containing specific provisions that ultimately framed the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (PNG) (see Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, 1974).

The work of the Constitutional Planning Committee was to set the framework in negotiating the future destiny of the soon-to-be Independent State of PNG. The Constitutional Planning Committee's report covered an array of themes ranging from the system of government; the rights of citizens; the powers of Constitutional offices; external relations; and so forth. But perhaps the most profound insights in the visionary thinking of the Constitutional Planning Committee were the inclusion of the National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDPs) in Chapter 2 of the Report.

Reflective of the challenge in creating a post-colonial society, where common national narratives were drawn from amongst the diverse cultures and peoples who would make up the nascent PNG nation-state, the NGDP were to serve as a benchmark to guide decision-making and the national discourses and practices in PNG. It was envisaged that Constitution should work within the framework of the NGDPs.⁴

² Included in the terms of reference were thirteen subject matters.

³ Chief Minister in the House of Assembly on 23 June, 1972 is quoted thus: "To make recommendations for a Constitution for full internal self-government in a united Papua New Guinea with a view to eventual independence. Without limiting the power of the Committee to make any investigation or recommendation which it deems relevant to this objective, matters to be considered by the Committee for possible incorporation into the Constitution or related documents....."

⁴ "The Committee has decided that, as the Constitution is the basic charter of the country, it is essential that it incorporates the fundamental national goals towards which the people and we leaders are working" (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, 1974).

PART I: The PNG Vision 2050 in its current form

1.1. The background to the Vision 2050

In the Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee of 1974, an enduring question is posed by the Constitutional Planning Committee. The question reads: **What kind of society do we want?** The Constitutional Planning Committee on the eve of Independence framed the National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDPs) with this question in mind. The Constitutional Planning Committee intended to generate national mobilization towards creating the ideal society Papua New Guineans aspired for themselves and their future generations. The NGDPs also sought to provide the impetus for a national reorientation of the PNG society.

The creation of the Vision 2050 is testament of the “lost opportunities” in living up to the expectations of the NGDPs.⁵ In the first 34 years of PNG’s political independence, the failure in taking ownership of the NGDPs and actualizing its aims into national development thinking provided the basis for the renewed interest in a long-term strategic plan. The beginnings of the Vision 2050 must be understood in this context.

Papua New Guineans presently are contending with multidimensional challenges and complex issues that may require integrated intervention in policy and legislation. Developmental challenges are interconnected in various ways to the overall progress of the country; hence the integrated nature of the Vision 2050. The Vision 2050 was purposely done to guide development where workable strategies and stated targets are outlined.

There is a crucial distinction in the Constitutional Planning Committee and the National Strategic Plan Taskforce (framers of the PNG Vision 2050) approach to policy and institutional application of the NGDPs and the Vision 2050 respectively.⁶ The Constitutional Planning Committee recommended that the NGDPs be specifically referenced in any undertaking of government and its instrumentalities, especially “their relevance to national policies and programs” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 128).

In a sense autonomy was given to Papua New Guineans to creatively use their own initiatives in development, but with the NGDPs as their constant point of reference. On the other hand the Vision 2050’s Chapters 3 and 4 provide very detailed directives about the various sectors of development and the specific expectations of implementation of the 7 Pillars or priority sectors. The quantification of development is stressed in the PNG Vision 2050.

⁵ Even a decade after Independence, a Constitutional Review exercise undertaken by the General Constitutional Commission in 1983 concluded that there has been a failure to observe and implement the NGDPs “in every level of government.....Our proposal therefore stresses the need for positive steps to be taken to ensure that government actions and decisions are made or taken with full appreciation and application of our nation’s ideals” (General Constitutional Commission Final Report 1983 Ch.3. A2, pp. 19-20). See also Narokobi (2013) for a discussion on the constraints associated with the implementation of the NGDPs.

⁶ Obviously visions or goals and directive principles need actual strategies to be implemented. The Vision 2050 is explicit about the challenge of having practicable actions to achieve desired outcomes in national efforts. It recognizes the need for an “overarching vision with clear, achievable strategic actions” (GoPNG, 2010:19).

In hindsight, much of this reasoning behind the NGDPs was that it would naturally be a guide. Its articulation in the Preamble to the Constitution would signify its permanent character and would allow the NGDPs to permeate the “hearts and minds” of institutions of State and the citizenry, ensuring that it becomes “the philosophy of life by which we want to live and the social and economic goals we want to achieve” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 2).

The basis for the NSPT in crafting the PNG Vision 2050 is derived from a directive in the Constitutional Planning Committee Report. In the Constitutional Planning Committee Report (Chapter 2, Section 5) the Constitutional Planning Committee provide indications about the relevance of strategic planning in national development:

“Now is that historic moment in our search for identity and self-fulfillment to take the necessary measures to make substantial changes in all of our institutions, to create new ones, and to redirect development when things are fluid and tractable. But for us to know clearly what measures should be taken, our objectives must be clearly established”.

The Vision 2050 on the basis of this exhortation by the Constitutional Planning Committee has undertaken to “‘decide on a destination’ for Papua New Guinea in order to fulfill the dreams of our founding fathers and put the right mechanisms in place to direct this long-term development plan” (GoPNG, 2010:18). The Vision 2050 is designed to address long-term planning. That is, even though the “the country’s forefathers had a clear vision for the nation at Independence, the journey towards achieving that vision was hampered by a lack of clear strategic actions in the ensuing development plans” (ibid.).

Though the NGDPs framework was established to guide Papua New Guinean thinking on development, it lacked the practical strategic plans to guide implementation. Much of the initiative was left to Papua New Guineans to make sense of in their respective positions in the community and public service.

In the introductory section of the Vision 2050 document another question is posed. This question evidently guided the NSPT: **“Where are we going?”** Here, the NSPT does not address the outcome of development as envisaged by the Constitutional Planning Committee, rather; it sees development as a progressive linear phenomenon. A reading of the question at the outset of the Vision 2050 is important because it assumes that there is indeed an “ultimate destination” in the unending evolutionary process of “development”.

This “destination” for PNG’s aspirations is provided by the writers of the Vision 2050. According to the NSPT, the development blue-print or PNG Vision 2050 will aim to build a “smart, wise, fair, healthy and happy society”. It is anticipated that with the Vision 2050 as guide, by the year 2050, PNG should aspire to bring its developmental indicators, notably the Human Development Index (HDI) well into the top 50 of the United Nations-defined ranking system of development. So not only is there a destination in sight for PNG under the Vision 2050, but more interestingly an ambitious timeframe of 40 years is also conceived. That is, within 40 years (beginning in

2010) the vision of a “smart, wise, fair, healthy and happy society” will be created under the guidance of the Vision 2050.

To situate this discuss, let us firstly introduce the background of the Vision 2050 to provide some context to the discussions. And to begin, we situate the development of the Vision 2050 within the timeframe of 2002 to 2010. This timeframe is critical for our grasping the key determinants in the creation of the Vision 2050. At the national and global level, the importance of development as a quantifiable phenomenon affected the manner in which the Vision 2050 was designed. Likewise, the period of relative political stability under the Somare-led government (2002 to 2007) compelled national leaders to use the political climate of government continuity as an assurance towards policy implementation.

However at the end of a first full term in office (2002 to 2007) by the then prime minister, Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare, it became self-evident that the political stability enjoyed by the Somare-led government did not automatically translate into improved changes in the developmental indicators of the country.⁷

1.2. The national context

Under the leadership of Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare, the National Alliance party secured its second term through the 2007 General Elections. The general feeling was that the political reforms of the early 2000s had finally yielded political maturity.⁸ In December 2007 the National Executive Council (NEC) on advice from the National Planning Committee (NPC) embarked on re-defining the development priorities for PNG with clearly earmarked points of reference to timeframes and achievable outcomes. In September 2008, government and national leaders endorsed a National Strategic Plan Framework. Somare’s government further tasked the NPC in December 2008 with the responsibility of developing a vision to guide the socio-economic development of PNG.

In the month of August the following year (2009), the “Government reached agreement with the governors of the provinces, resulting in the ‘Morobe Communiqué’”, setting “the tone for the

⁷ Sir Mekere Morauta was critical of the inability of the then Somare-led government to translate political stability to ensure equitable development stating: “....the Somare Government spent a staggering K60 billion during its nine years in office. Yet our national infrastructure is crumbling around us. Our roads are full of potholes, our ports are congested and our universities and hospitals are dilapidated. Our people are suffering: there aren’t enough schools for our children, aid posts for our communities or jobs for our youths. One government; political stability; revenue galore; but where did all the money go? What can be seen for it? No dividend for our people. Why? The discipline which should be (and once was) inherent in budget processes has disappeared. Billions of kina was parked by the last Government in trust accounts, and walked out, seemingly without trace. Public money is not being used properly; there is no budget discipline; the public service lacks capacity; and there is no accountability for expenditure or for poor results” (Sir Mekere Morauta, June 5, 2012).

⁸ Indeed the full-term in office of the Somare-led government is acknowledged in the Vision 2050 as a strength that was in need of being consolidated. In the view of the NSPT the “legislative reforms [under Morauta’s government] have improved continuity in government, with the 2002 to 2007 Government being the first to serve a full five-year term in the country’s political history. The same government is on course to complete a second full term, up to 2012” (GoPNG, 2010: 20). The Somare government that came in after the 2007 General Elections however was dismembered in August 2, 2011 after Parliament under controversial circumstances moved to remove Sir Michael as the prime minister.

future of Papua New Guinea, as envisioned under Vision 2050” (Somare, cited in GoPNG, 2010: x). From the National Strategic Plan Framework endorsed in 2008, the concepts and strategic direction in the framework were taken to the provinces and almost all the districts in PNG in a series of consultative engagement. The consultation and stakeholder meetings were conducted from June to September in 2009.

In October 2009, the PNG Vision 2050 was launched and its implementation subsequently comes under the stewardship of the Department of Prime Minister and National Executive Council (DPM&NEC) and newly created PNG Vision 2050 Centre. The envisaged timeframe for the operationalization of the PNG Vision 2050 will be 40 years beginning in the year 2010. Within the 40 year timeframe, the first 10 years (that is, 2010 to 2020) is considered the foundational period where key reforms and anticipated intervention in the development of the economy is concentrated.

Within the time period from 2010 to 2020, the State is required to facilitate “strategic planning, better service delivery and improved governance” (GoPNG, 2010: 25), and other sectoral priorities; namely, “identification and training of human capital, tariff reduction, increased trade, education reform and implementation, downstream processing and manufacturing and land reform” (GoPNG, 2010: 25). The PNG Vision 2050 also assigns the task of implementing “impact projects in the 89 districts must also be carried out to build the base for growth during 2010 to 2020 and set the foundation for future years” (ibid.).

This progressive build-up of momentum in the implementation of the Vision 2050 will operate under a crafted series of scenarios. The four scenarios outlined in the PNG Vision 2050 aims to broaden out the economic base of the PNG economy (see **Figure 1**). If effectively implemented, mass-based sectors of the economy would naturally emerge as an alternative to the extractive sectors of the economy. This is the projected scenario in the implementation of the Vision 2050.




Figure 1: Expected Real GDP under 4 Scenarios within the 2010-2020 timeframe (Source: GoPNG, 2010:27).

In considering the domestic factors that gave rise to the creation of the PNG Vision 2050 we view the PNG LNG project as another significant starting point. When the Somare government came to office in 2007, the PNG government tentatively began negotiations for the LNG project with ExxonMobil. It was anticipated at that time that the construction phase of the LNG project would begin in 2010. This landmark investment project gained traction and was widely acclaimed at that time as a single most important economic venture for the PNG economy.

Bolstering investor confidence and promising transformational effect in the wider PNG economy, the LNG project was factored into the scenarios of the PNG Vision 2050:

“With the inclusion of the LNG project, Papua New Guinea’s real GDP growth will be even higher. It is estimated that real GDP will average K18.2 billion a year from 2014 onwards as a result of value adding. That is an additional K9 billion a year above the current level of real GDP. This estimate is considered too high. A more conservative estimate of a K5 billion incremental increase a year, on average, is taken. Real GDP will reach K20 billion by 2020. Per capita income is projected to reach K2 420.50 by 2020” (GoPNG, 2010:4).

The Vision 2050 provides “four possible pathways for the economy” in its decade-long outlook. These “four economic scenarios are provided on the possible paths the Papua New Guinean economy should take from 2010 to 2020 in relation to economic growth, supported by the seven Strategic Focus Areas of Vision 2050”. (GoPNG, 2010:25). The four scenarios (or pathways for the PNG economy) include: (1) The Base Case; (2) Land Reform; (3) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project; and (4) Cumulative Scenario.

The Base Case relates to the non-mining sectors of the economy and basic public goods deployed toward growing the economy of the country. The second scenario – land reform in the Vision 2050 is considered a critical precondition for the first 10 years.⁹ Land reform is earmarked in the Vision 2050 as a critical prerequisite for any transformations in the economic development of PNG.

Hence “decision makers should not relent in their push for land reform, as the multiplier effects of such a reform would reverberate throughout the country past the life-span of the LNG project” (GoPNG, 2010:26). Within the first 10 years of the implementation of the Vision 2050, it is anticipated that land reforms, if undertaken successfully will contribute to the growth in PNG’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from “K9.7 [in 2010] to K12.5 billion [in 2020], which is an increase of K2.8 billion” (GoPNG, 2010:4).

⁹ No doubt there are associated issues with this agenda and especially when the debacle at the Department of Lands and Physical Planning in the administration of the Special Agricultural Business Leases (SABL) is a recurring challenge. In the Vision 2050 specific commitments are made where the Vision 2050 will provide guidelines to the Department of Lands and Physical Planning “in order to implement land reform programs and explore ways of making landholding more conducive to promoting economic development” (NSPT, 2010:49). There is also a very critical need to reform the Department of Lands and Physical Planning so that accountability mechanisms are maintained. Public officials in this particular department need extensive ethical scrutiny in how they conduct their activities given the notoriety associated with the SABL-related controversy (see Filer, 2011).

In terms of the LNG project, its consideration in the design of the Vision 2050 is significant in one very fundamental way. The LNG project features in the four pathways to economic growth because it is the yardstick in the progressive attempts to phasing out PNG's dependence on the extractive sector of the economy. The LNG project will provide a temporary stimulus in the first ten years of the implementation of the Vision 2050.

Proceeds from the LNG will support the government's "efforts to stabilize service delivery and infrastructure development" (GoPNG, 2010: 26), whilst the simultaneous drive for land reforms continues in earnest. The 10-year timeframe will be a test case timeframe where land reforms or the base case can be fully implemented towards cushioning the anticipated easing of PNG's overall dependence on the LNG revenues.¹⁰ PNG has long been dependent on the extractive sector with little to show for in positive socio-economic development.

The Vision 2050 seeks to facilitate mass-based development but is regardless premised on the assumption that "once strong growth has been achieved in the mining industries and the renewable resource-based exports, it is important to use that income to create more opportunities to grow the economy" (GoPNG, 2010:3). Essentially then, the mining sector will stimulate this envisaged diversification of the PNG economic. But is there any credible guarantee that PNG will eventually relinquish this persistent dependence on the mining sector?

Continued dependence on the mining sector will only prolong the continued dominance by transnational corporations in the mining sector of the economy. The Constitutional Planning Committee's warning remains relevant today: "If Self-government and Independence are to have real meaning these milestones must be accompanied by a substantial measure of control by Papua New Guinea over economic enterprises throughout the country". It is therefore apparent that PNG cannot practice true independence if its development is pinned to the mining sector.

The national imperative for a vision to guide development can also be attributed to the decline in the overall developmental status of the country. Periods of poor economic performances are documented in the Vision 2050. From 1989 to 1990, and 1995 to 2002, economic growth was noticeably poor. And even though there were periods of relative positive economic growth, as experienced from 1981 to 1988, 1991 to 1994, and 2003 to 2008, this did not automatically translate into improved social development performance for the country (GoPNG, 2010:1).

It is argued elsewhere that "the 1990s may be rightly described as PNG's decade of lost opportunity" (Independent State of PNG, 2004:4).¹¹ This period witnessed major new mining and petroleum projects beginning production. However much of the benefits of these projects were not translated into improved social and economic indicators for the country.

Unfortunate experiences of mismanaged economic growth have informed the crafting of the Vision 2050. PNG's experience with positive economic growth without any corresponding

¹⁰The Vision 2050's "intention also is to ensure that structural changes in the economy are not dependent on the success of the LNG project, or other projects that are being planned" (NSPT, 2010:58). Banking on the extractive sector as the life-line of the PNG economy is obviously an issue that the Vision 2050 has embarked on steering PNG away from.

¹¹ Independent State of PNG (2004) Medium Term Development Strategy 2005 – 2010, Waigani

improvements in terms of social development performance are sobering reminders of the need for good ethical leadership in the administration of national developmental visions (see Sinebare, 2015). The Vision 2050's emphasis on an integrated approach to development can rightly be heralded as innovative in this regard. The Vision 2050 is an integrated approach because it:

“encompasses institutional development and service delivery, human and social capital development, wealth creation, security and international relations, environmental sustainability and climate change and churches and development. When operationalised, there will be cross-cutting issues, such as institutional policies, budgets and human resources. Programs and policies at all levels will be aligned with the vision. *It will have to be institutionalised through appropriate legislation to make it effective*” (GoPNG, 2010: 58, emphasis ours).¹²

Poor governance and the associated problems of corruption have also been rightly identified as the major threat to the implementation and realization of the Vision 2050 (see Ambang, 2012; Sinebare, 2015).

The design of the Vision 2050 attempts to also address cross-cutting issues “that may have an adverse impact on the development processes” (GoPNG, 2010: 53). PNG's Vision 2050 claims to incorporate some of these cross-cutting issues in the overall development strategies (ibid.).¹³ For instance climate change and its adverse effects are real and serious agendas that the NSPT has had to acknowledge in the writing of the Vision 2050. Climate change and environmental sustainability feature prominently as one of the seven pillars in the Vision 2050.¹⁴

Likewise growing the economy, and unlocking land for development is perceived by the NSPT as a key component of the economic diversification process in Vision 2050. The Vision 2050 for instance has embarked on assigning agriculture as a renewable sector beyond the LNG project. Agriculture is treated as a sector that can contribute to major export earnings for the PNG economy. The emphasis presently is on consolidating the implementation strategies for the National Agriculture Development Plan (NADP).

Not only are the poor social and economic indicators of the country a justification for a rethinking of development strategies. Disparities in terms of individual income, and district or provincial access to basic services are also evident. The Constitutional Planning Committee warned about inequitable development in its 1974 Constitutional Planning Committee Report. In the words of the Constitutional Planning Committee:

¹² Note here that the NSPT is directing government to institutionalize the Vision 2050 through appropriate legislation so that is consistently implemented throughout the life of the 40 years of this vision.

¹³ Examples of such cross-cutting issues as reflected in the Vision 2050 include: Gender, HIV/AIDS, Law and Order and People with Disabilities (NSPT, 2010: 53-54). We should also add that climate change is also a cross-cutting issue given its potential to adversely impact on other facets of development.

¹⁴ PNG is of course informed by the realities associated with the climate change phenomenon. PNG has the unfortunate record of being one of the first countries in the world to experience the phenomenon of “climate refugees” (see Bohane, 2009). Climate change also stands to wreck havoc on food security, land management, demographic distribution, ecological biodiversity, economic growth and so forth.

“we are well aware that no two people are exactly alike, in personality, ability or initiative. Some have more determination and drive than others.....The Government should actively seek to increase the proportion of the economic benefits of our country's development which goes to those who have the lowest incomes, whether they be living in villages or towns. We believe our people are firmly against "elitism" which is both unjust and undemocratic, and leads to the kinds of social problems which we are experiencing now in our main towns, where disparities in wealth are most obvious” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para.50)

Equal distribution of the wealth of the country is a fundamental principle in the Preamble to the Constitution of PNG. Unfortunately the changes in society have seen a rapid escalation in socio-economic stratification in PNG society. Benefits from the many resource projects have eluded most Papua New Guineans resulting in ever-growing disparities (Miranda et al., 2003).

1.3. The Vision 2050 in summary

In this section we provide an overview of the essential themes in the PNG Vision 2050. The Vision 2050 is sub-divided into five chapters. This is of course excluding the introductory part on the “directional and enabling statements” (pp.1-14). In the “directional and enabling statements” component of the Vision 2050, the rationale for the creation of the Vision 2050 is outlined.

In the ‘direction and enabling statements’, a give-away in the Vision 2050 is the guiding principle. The NSPT came up with an additional guiding principle - ***Guiding Principle No. 6 — Papua New Guinea Is Progressive and Globally Competitive***” (p.2) that is added to the NGDPs. This guiding principle complements the 5 NGDPs enunciated by the Constitutional Planning Committee in their 1974 Report. It is basically a belated recognition of PNG’s position in global economic relationships and the opportunities for the out-ward orientation of the PNG economy.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of national planning initiatives undertaken during the formative years of PNG’s nationhood. Critical lessons are learnt through the “nation-building experiences”, and “are now guiding the development of Vision 2050” (p.19). Basically the whole chapter 1 (pp. 15 – 19) of the Vision 2050 is justification towards the need for a Vision 2050. The chapter outlines a brief history of development planning in PNG, socio-economic development experiences, economic performance and the rationale for the Vision 2050.

After 34 years of independence from 1975 to 2009, the population of the country stood at 6.5 million (from about 2 million at Independence) but the same challenges inhibiting development in PNG – challenges that are documented in the Foot Report of the 1960s – remain unchanged. For instance the geographical terrain of the country is used to demonstrate the impregnable challenges to development and equitable distribution of government services the disparate communities across the length and breadth of this country. .

A particularly interesting aspect of this chapter is the justification for the need for a long-term development strategy. Socio-economic development and especially the failure of development

are attributed in this instance to a lack of practical long-term visions (“new development course”) for the country. The rationale for Vision 2050 is situated in “the lack of progress” since 1975. The Vision 2050 diagnoses earlier on the challenges experienced in the first 35 years of PNG Independence.

- the absence of long term and clear strategic actions in development plans;
- the poor foundation inherited at independence, coupled with poor governance in later years;
- lack-luster economic performance, particularly during the periods 1989 – 1990, and 1995–2002; and,
- poor social development despite the positive economic growth experienced during 1981–1988, 1991–1994, and 2003-2008.

Whilst the writers of the Vision 2050 see the “absence of long term and clear strategic actions in development plans” as one of the main challenges in PNG’s existence as a nation, it is worth recollecting what the Constitutional Planning Committee had in mind with the NGDPs in 1974. The aim of the NGDPs was to set out:

“A clear definition of Papua New Guinea's most fundamental national goals, and a statement setting out the implications of their acceptance for the ways in which the Government seeks to achieve those goals, is of great importance to the welfare of our people and to the effectiveness of the Constitution in promoting it. Now that our country has become fully self-governing and its duly elected leaders have taken over virtually complete control of all internal governmental activity, the need for definite, widely known, long term objectives to guide them in their decision-making, is apparent. With the need for development so widespread, it is crucial that national priorities be in accordance with these objectives” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, 1974, para. 3).

Contrary to the Vision 2050’s assumptions about the absence of “long term and clear strategic actions”, in the very same chapter (Chapter 1) of the Vision 2050 document, the experiences with national planning efforts are highlighted. The Vision 2050 makes reference to the 1976 National Development Strategy, National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP) of 1978-1986 and the five-year Medium Term Development Strategies (GoPNG, 2010:16).

If the history of development planning in PNG is littered with failed experimentations with national plans and strategies, then obviously the problem may lie elsewhere. We do not think therefore that the NGDPs were vague or impractical in implementation as it is implied in the Vision 2050. The creativity and initiative in making the NGDPs a reality were never part of the uninspired officials working the institutions of government and the citizenry in the post-Independence era.

A telling reminder of the institutional problems at the heart of the implementation process is uncovered from the statements made by the Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare. As one of the surviving members of the Constitutional Planning Committee and once Chief Minister in 1972, he admits 34 years later that the service delivery in the rural communities where the bulk of the

population is located lag behind the urban centers. Lamenting the failure of development, Sir Michael affirms that “...service delivery to our people, particularly in the rural communities, prompted us to give particular attention to institutional development and service delivery through the service delivery mechanism” (GoPNG, 2010: x).

The NSPT also cite extensively some of the post-Independence economic prognosis (Goodman, Lepani, and Morawetz, 1985:3) to highlight what was evidently the growing disparity amongst citizens and regions, and of course the growing gap between the rich and the poor. The much-stated goal of equalization and equal distribution of the national wealth of the country in the Constitutional Planning Committee Report had not materialized in the decades after Independence.¹⁵

Chapter 1 also introduces us to the on-going obsession with economic performances and the yardsticks in measuring the global position of PNG on development indicators. The case it seems is made for PNG to consider global development indices as the guide in its national endeavors.

The second chapter (Chapter 2) of the Vision 2050 attempts projecting the future development scenarios (pp. 20 – 30). The second chapter is a national SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats) exercise. The political stability from 2002 to 2007 is appraised as a potential indicator of growing political maturity. Economically, PNG progressed well with a “real GDP growth recovery from 2.2 percent in 2003 to 7.2 percent in 2008” (GoPNG, 2010:17).

PNG’s foreign relations with its traditional partners like Australia, India and China is taken in this chapter of the PNG Vision 2050 as an opportunity worth consolidating on through increased trade relations. PNG’s cordial involvements in the regional trade associations such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) trading within its member countries seem to be progressing from strength to strength.

The second chapter also provides an assessment of the challenges of national development. The national scene is deemed to be more disoriented. For instance the notorious law and order problems remain unchanged. In addition, the deteriorating infrastructure and aging working-age population is identified as an inhibiting factor on productivity. The public service machinery is highlighted in this chapter as warranting serious rehabilitation. Indeed, the problems compounding the service delivery mechanism is attributed to the complexities in the PNG public management systems where “although established systems and processes are in place, they are not always followed and breaches are not effectively penalized” (GoPNG; 2010:22).

Owing to policy lapses in the first 34 years of independence, the bulk of the population was unaccounted for in terms of access to basic government services such as health and education

¹⁵ In the Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report (1974), one of the objectives of the Second NGDPs (Equality and Participation) is to foster nation-building. The Constitutional Planning Committee envisaged that marginalization of peoples in a newly independent state would disempower citizens and destabilize national unity. It was therefore stated that the: “goal of achieving equality of opportunity and participation in our national life is not, then, something for which we may piously hope, but a vital necessity if we are to achieve genuine national integration” (para. 36).

services. The inefficiency of the public service is also crippled as a result of public official corruption still remains high with white collar crimes being the dominant theme.

Chapter 2 also provides justification for mass-based economic development. Hitherto, the structure of the economy is attuned towards the extractive industries. The extractive sector is very much prone to external shocks due to the current global trend in economic inter-connectedness. On the other hand the subsistence agriculture plays a vital role in the PNG economy which can be seen from the existence of about more than 700, 000 registered small scale to medium businesses in the country.

However, the environment in PNG is still considered not conducive to business. The law and order situation leading to high security and insurance costs; poor infrastructure, particularly transport infrastructure; high transportation costs, especially coastal shipping and airlines; ineffective customs services; high utility costs; and unfavorable pricing arrangement for certain inputs, such as fuel products are obvious threats to the goal of securing sustainable economic growth (GoPNG, 2010: 23).

Essentially, the structural barriers to wholesome development and participation are highlighted in Chapter 2. The adjoining challenge the NSPT put is: How do we ensure that Papua New Guinea's natural wealth is exploited and primary products are processed responsibly, and that derived revenues are used equitably, transparently and efficiently to arrest service delivery decline and above all, create the foundations for employment and broad-based growth for the next 40 years and beyond?

To accommodate for the possible future scenarios, the NSPT propose the operationalization of the Vision 2050 on four Case Scenarios. The four case scenarios were devised to address the possible situation in line with the economic growth backed by the Seven Pillars of the Vision 2050; *the Base Case; Land Reform; Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project; and Cumulative Scenario*. As we have explained in above (pages 9-13), the Case Scenarios assist with the diversification of the economic structure of the PNG economy. It is envisaged that the extractive industry will subsequently give way to more broad-based economic activities, thus cushioning the associated problems of dependence on mining as a source of government income.

In Chapter 3 (pages 30 to 54), the conceptual framework of the Vision 2050 is garnished with more elaborate details and timeframes. This component of the Vision 2050 seems more technocratic and is by far the most extended of the 5 chapters in the Vision 2050 documents. We believe from our reading of this chapter that it embodies the most critical elements of the Vision 2050.

The technocratic jargons and language should in the meantime be understood in its entirety within the implementing agencies of government and amongst stakeholders in the service delivery situations of this country. Given that the Vision 2050 guides overall planning and implementation ("cascading manner") it will be of great service to the predominantly local-levels of government and other stakeholders to be cognizant of the cascading principle associated with

the Vision 2050.¹⁶ But perhaps the most outstanding feature of this chapter of the Vision 2050 is the comprehensive coverage it gives to the relevant development sectors of PNG.

Chapter 4 (pages 54 to 57) directs government to institutionalize the Vision 2050. According to the NSPT:

“The Government must develop appropriate policy and legislative frameworks for institutionalising Vision 2050. This includes amendments to relevant sections of the *Constitution* and the introduction of appropriate legislation to give effect to the establishment of an independent entity that will drive Vision 2050” (GoPNG, 2010: 55).

Indeed this is the challenge to the continuity and longevity to the PNG Vision 2050. The Constitutionality of the Vision 2050 document is a national priority. The Office of the Vision 2050’s consistent funding will enable it to coordinate the activities of the various stakeholders in the country. It is a daunting task indeed, and one that needs to be complemented with legal status.

Consolidating partnership and information communication strategy and the appraisal of the Vision 2050 are legitimate concerns. The 40 duration of the Vision 2050 and its ambitious agenda of engineering the social, political and economic lifestyle of PNG is a serious matter it should not be left to chance. A test of how serious government is with the goals enunciated in the Vision 2050 will be demonstrated in its passing enabling legislations to make the Vision 2050 the national vision it purports to be – the “people’s plan”!

¹⁶ This vision will be best achieved if the Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS), sectoral strategies and corporate plans of sectors and agencies align their strategic objectives to the Vision 2050 and its mission in a cascading manner.

PART II: A comparative analysis of the PNG Vision 2050 and the National Goals and Directive Principles in the Preamble of the PNG Constitution

2.1. Questions of Legitimacy and Ownership

“We did not determine these national goals in a matter of days or weeks. We have distilled them after a great deal of thought and discussion over the twenty-two months during which our Committee has been at work. During that time, as we have mentioned in our Introduction, we held well over one hundred public meetings in all parts of the country, and we received thousands of submissions, verbally and in writing, many of which were concerned either directly or indirectly, with the type of society we should seek to build for ourselves” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 10).

“Vision 2050 is derived from the National Strategic Plan Framework that was endorsed by the Government and national leaders in September 2008. The concepts and strategic direction in the framework were rigorously tested during a three-month comprehensive public consultation program in which the 89 districts were visited. Vision 2050, therefore, is the formalizing of many citizens’ dreams and aspirations of building a better Papua New Guinea for ourselves, our children and our grandchildren” (GoPNG, 2010:30).

In this part of the analysis, we extract components of the Vision 2050, and evaluate their consistency with the expressed intentions of the NGDPs. There are two components in Part 2. In this first section, we address the question - Is our “home-grown” National Goals # 1-5 of the PNG Constitution *reflected* in the PNG Vision 2050? The approach we take in this exercise will basically involve comparing select elements of the NGDPs against the stated strategies of the Vision 2050.

In the course of this analysis we will show that the NGDPs are not reflected in the proposed strategies of the Vision 2050. In most instances, the re-interpretation of the NGDPs by the National Strategic Plan Taskforce (NSPT), and suggested strategies in advancing these re-interpretations of the NGDPs is antithetical to the original intentions of that of the Constitutional Planning Committee.

In the second section of the exercise we will seek to answer the question - *To what extent* does our “home-grown” National Goals # 1 to 5 and its subsequent Directive Principles of the PNG constitution captured in the PNG Vision 2050? In this section we will ascertain the relative commonalities and complementary features of the NGDPs and the Vision 2050. Here we will use the Seven Pillars’ “statement of achievable objectives” as the starting point.

These statements of achievable objectives are compared with the directives of the NGDPs. The objective here is to demonstrate shared semblances of the objectives of the Vision 2050 with those of the NGDPs. We have simplified this comparative exercise into a tabular form. We will refer to Table 1 (in the Appendix) in the following sub-sections of this paper.

In undertaking any exercise of this nature, we recognize the inherent limitations. The texts and expressed intentions of the writers of the Vision 2050 and the NGDPs are open to interpretations. Times have changed and the dynamism of society can also weigh against any literal reading of written text, and by extension its original intent.

The Vision 2050 assures Papua New Guineans that “[W]hen the directional statements together with the seven pillars are effectively and efficiently implemented in programs and projects, Papua New Guinea will be transformed into an emerging developing country” (p. xiv). Given the guaranteed assurance for PNG becoming “a smart, fair, wise, healthy and happy nation” in the year 2050, the key assumptions of the seven pillars are critical aspects of the Vision 2050 that are considered in this analysis. A re-reading of these essential elements of the Vision 2050 is in order.

2.1.1. The Vision 2050

The PNG Vision 2050 is acknowledged as the official government policy-making and implementation guide in PNG. It does not have Constitutional status, but is merely an executive directive. Officials and agencies of the government, as well as non-state actors and donor agencies are urged to align their planning schedules, programs and implementation activities with the Vision 2050 (GoPNG, 2010: 10-11). How the Vision 2050 is integrated into the overall institutional structure and national life of the country will determine the crucial process of implementation of the vision. We believe there are parallel lessons in history from the implementation (or non implementation) of the NGDPs that can be learnt in the implementation of the Vision 2050.

Before we critically examine the Vision 2050 and its consistency with the NGDPs, it is perhaps insightful to begin with a brief recap of the origins of both the Vision 2050 and the NGDPs. We have detailed the chronological evolution of the Vision 2050 in Part 1 of this analysis. The PNG Vision 2050’s background in this instant is significant when we seek to explain its cross-generational appeal.

One will notice that a recurring theme in the introductory sections of the Vision 2050 is the emphasis on its ability to continuously appeal to generations of Papua New Guineans in its 40 year duration. In the Ministerial Statements introducing the Vision 2050 document, the then Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare and Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Planning Committee, Dr. Puka Temu go through great lengths in affirming the legitimacy of the PNG Vision 2050. This is understandable.

Forty years in the implementation of Vision 2050 is a long time. Continuity and stability are important prerequisites needed in making the vision a reality. To achieve its objectives the Vision 2050 is expected to garner popular support and facilitate not only socio-economic transformations, but equally a fundamental re-thinking of development in PNG. After all, one of the stated outcomes of this national vision is for the “changing and rehabilitation of the mind-set of our people (GoPNG, 2010: xiv).

To be truly part of the national consciousness of the PNG people, why is the legitimacy and authoritative claims of the Vision 2050 relevant? Assessing the legitimacy of the Vision 2050 is

important in two respects. Firstly, it will determine how the Vision 2050, a vision that aspires to be inter-generational has to remain generally relevant, and continuously appeal to its intended audience over the course of its time. Directions from the NSPT for the institutionalization of the vision and the creation of enabling legislations are part of this process. As a matter of national legislative priority ensuring the capacity of the Vision 2050 to transcend beyond 2010 will determine its continuity.

Secondly, within the envisaged timeframe of the Vision 2050, it must also be accommodating of other emergent populist agendas in its time.¹⁷ Although the Vision 2050 is designed in a manner to enable its continuous appraisal, the political will needed to ensure the thorough institutionalization of this vision is a key to its success. The displacement of the Vision 2050 by other short-term politically-driven agendas in its time has the potential to undermine its intended purposes, and seriously dent the confidence in its objectives.

In PNG, politicians' main preoccupation is seeking re-election in elections. When politicians are in the drivers' seats of so-called national visions, their interests will supersede that of the national interest. Simply the short-term urges of politicians will need to be constrained in view of the overall objectives of the Vision 2050. Government agencies, non-state actors and most importantly the public have a role to play in keeping political leaders consistently attuned to the Vision 2050 as the overarching vision of the country. Hence gauging the Vision 2050's authoritative claims is relevant for our analysis.

In his introductory statements ('The Next Generation of Nation Builders', p. x), Sir Michael Somare assures the nation of the "home-grown" origins of the PNG Vision 2050. He qualifies the legitimacy of the PNG Vision 2050 thus:

"the aspirations that are reflected in Vision 2050 have been derived from wide consultations with our people from the 89 constituencies in the country. Simple villagers, mothers, children, qualified academics, and other professionals have contributed to this document. The final version of Vision 2050 has been prepared by our own sons and daughters, with inputs from some of our most qualified citizens" (p. x).

Sir Puka Temu in acknowledging the process of consultation that led to the writing of the Vision 2050 concludes: "I therefore believe that Vision 2050 is truly the '*people's vision*' (p.xii). Elsewhere in the text of the PNG Vision 2050, the Vision 2050 is also referred to as a "people's plan" (p.59). The origins of the PNG Vision 2050 are also made reference to in the body of the document.¹⁸ This reference to the Vision 2050 as a "people's vision" is Dr. Temu's attempt to portray the document as a legitimate and authoritative national development blue-print. However

¹⁷ Take for instance the government-formation compact of 2012, or what is popularly referred to as the "Alotau Accord". In official policy initiatives, the "Alotau Accord" takes centre-stage as the guiding framework of policy-making. Where does the Vision 2050 fit in such a politically-driven agenda as the "Alotau Accord"? Is the Alotau Accord inspired by the "people's plan, the PNG Vision 2050?"

¹⁸ In September 2008, government and national leaders endorsed a National Strategic Plan Framework. From the National Strategic Plan Framework the concepts and strategic direction in the framework were "rigorously tested during a three-month comprehensive public consultation program" covering the 89 districts in the country (p.30).

there are serious questions about the methodology involved in the creation of this document, and the institutionalization of the Vision 2050 in the development process of this country.

Sir Puka Temu seeks to reassure readers in this instant when he confirms that: “The concepts and strategic direction in the framework of Vision 2050 were rigorously tested during a three-month comprehensive nationwide consultation program in the 89 districts and Papua New Guinean children, adolescents and adults were asked to contribute to the development of Vision 2050” (p.xii).

Sir Puka Temu (“Vision 2050: Our People’s Vision”) also confirms the close semblance of the PNG Vision 2050 with the NGDPs when he states: “Thirty-four years after our independence we are now making history by using the framework that was set in our National Goals and Directive Principles to develop Vision 2050” (p.xii). Dr. Temu boldly uses the NGDP as the time-less guide for the formulation of the Vision 2050.

In the subsequent texts of the Vision 2050, the NGDPs are made reference to no less than six times. No doubt the NSPT sought to reinforce the legitimacy of the Vision 2050 by aligning its intentions to that of the NGDPs. Claims of this nature seek to authoritatively assign public ownership of this document and for the purposes of ensuring its integration into the life of the society it claims to embody.

2.1.2. The NGDPs

On the other hand, the NGDPs were a product of a resounding process of consultation undertaken in the pre-Independence years. The Constitutional Planning Committee was given a specific set of terms of references with 13 subject matters to consult on.¹⁹ The Constitutional Planning Committee was also extended considerable powers to consult widely on areas it deemed relevant to the future of PNG.

About 500 discussion groups and meetings were held. Almost 60,000 peoples attended public meetings that were organized and held by the Constitutional Planning Committee. Furthermore, an estimated 2,000 written submissions were received by the Constitutional Planning Committee in the two years it was involved in the consultative process (Goldring, 1978:19-24).

The process of consultation undertaken by the Constitutional Planning Committee intended to frame the Constitution of PNG. And understandably the wide-ranging appeal for representativeness in the content of the Constitution was added incentive to the comprehensive levels of interactions with the PNG society. The NGDPs as a product of this consultative process is therefore a reflection of the popular will of the people. A legal scholar summarized the authoritative spirit of the Constitutional Planning Committee Report as follows:

¹⁹ The terms of reference included subjects such as the system of government – executive, legislature and judiciary, protection of minority rights, defence and foreign relations, citizenship, public service, public prosecutor and public solicitor Ombudsman, procedure for the amendment of the constitution, Bill of Rights, emergency powers and judicial review.

“In the eyes of the Constitutional Planning Committee and others this level of consultation gave the resulting proposal much legitimacy, in that the proposal truly reflected the will of the people. The process also demonstrated that as an emerging country, Papua New Guinea has both leaders and people with a strong sense of vision and commitment” (Cox, 2004:42).

Not only was the final Constitutional Planning Committee Report debated on the floor of the Constituent Assembly and passed, but in a subsequent provision of the National Constitution of PNG, section 25 of the National Constitution recognized the NGDPs as visions that should guide development thinking and processes in PNG. The acknowledgement of the NGDPs in the National Constitution of PNG gives credibility to its existence as an encompassing and timeless point of reference in development planning in PNG.

The creation of the Vision 2050 as a development planning tool in PNG raises additional questions about the NGDPs. What have been the lessons learnt from the existence of the NGDPs as overarching guides to policy development and planning?²⁰ The NSPT claims that though “the country’s forefathers had a clear vision for the nation at Independence, the journey towards achieving that vision was hampered by a lack of clear strategic actions in the ensuing development plans” (GoPNG, 2010: 18).

When the Constitutional Planning Committee first proposed the NGDPs, there was a specific recommendation for the establishment of “a body to review the laws and policy of state to determine their alignment with the NGDP and BSO [Basic Social Obligations]” (Narokobi, 2013). In Part I, Chapter 5 of the Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, the Constitutional Planning Committee in its wisdom envisaged the creation of “the Permanent Committee to review laws and policies for compliance with the Human Rights and Obligations and National Goals and Directive Principles set out in the Constitution” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Part I, Chapter 5). The indecisiveness over the years since Independence to give effect to this proposal has not allowed for the institutionalization of the NGDPs in the planning processes of government instrumentalities.

Therefore the creation of the Vision 2050 is heralded by the NSPT as the most practical approach to advancing the intentions of the NGDPs. But is this actually the case?

The ultimate success of the Vision 2050 is built on the learning curve derived from the experience of the NGDPs. To be accepted as a binding document across generations and be practical about the political realities in PNG, the recommendations for the institutionalizing of the Vision 2050 are addressed in the “Strategic planning” component of the document (1.17.11.1 – *Legislate for an independent entity to monitor and evaluate the implementation of Vision 2050*). The Vision 2050 also provides for a review and monitoring timeframe to ensure its continued implementation. The NSPT diagnosed an all-important aspect of implementation in the public service delivery system of PNG.

²⁰ This question can be the basis for future analysis should we wish to learn more about the experiences in the enforcement of the NGDPs and the relevance of “national visions” in PNG.

When the Constitutional Planning Committee first enunciated the NGDPs, their work was premised solely on the effectiveness of the institutions of government to take ownership of the NGDPs for PNG. They used the metaphor of a motor being driven by a driver with a specific destination in sight. This metaphor was used to demonstrate the need for a national vision:

“We leaders and people must know where we want to go before we can decide how we should get there. Before a driver starts a motor car, he should first decide on his destination, otherwise his driving will be without purpose, and he will achieve nothing. We Papua New Guineans are now in the driving seat. The road which we should follow ought to be marked out so that all will know the way ahead” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 4).

The NSPT deciphered this metaphorical use of words to mean the need for practical long-term strategies. In other words, the destination where PNG intends to reach must be comprehensively chartered prior to any proposed national development initiatives. However, is it merely a question of a long-term strategy, or final destination?

Using the Constitutional Planning Committee metaphor of “driving a motor car” let us examine some associated corollaries. Let us say a driver knows his or her directions and final destination. Is that enough of a precondition to a journey? Shouldn’t it also be advisable to do a thorough stock-take of the “motor car” itself? And consider the capacity of the “driver”; is he or she qualified to “drive” the “motor car” to the intended destination?

Observers of Papua New Guinean politics have discussed at length the incapacity of the institution of the State to fully integrate the expectations of the citizenry into tangible outcomes (Fukuyama, nd, Okole, 2006). It is fair judgement that the NGDPs were offloaded onto a “motor car” and a citizenry that was not in any shape capable of moving as expected.

The lost opportunities in materializing the NGDPs into national thinking must be reassurance in the need to concentrate on the most fundamental issues of institutional capabilities. The lessons learnt in the case of the failure of PNG to fulfil its commitment to the Millennium Development Goals also fed into the writing up of the Vision 2050. The most obvious was the public service delivery mechanism:

“Given service delivery complexities, progress towards the Millennium Development Goals targets will certainly remain out of reach, well beyond 2015, unless the basic platform for arresting the decline in service delivery, infrastructure and income distribution is laid, during the first ten years of Vision 2050. Political will is critical for service delivery” (GoPNG, 2010: 24).

Whilst the Vision 2050 offers practical strategic frameworks, the implementation phase has to learn from the experiences of the first forty years of the NGDPs. The problem may not necessarily be about the absence of a long-term plan, rather, the capabilities of the “motor car” that will take the “driver” to his or her intended destination.

Knowing too well the “lost opportunity” in the effective institutionalization and implementation of the NGDPs, the NSPT incorporated into the Vision 2050, the Third Pillar – Institutional Development and Service Delivery.²¹ Reforming the public service to ensure compliance with performance-based expectations is indeed a lesson in history that has featured in the articulation of the Vision 2050.

2.2. Are the NGDPs reflected in the Vision 2050: General Assessment

Is the “home-grown” NGDPs reflected in the PNG Vision 2050? Based on our concurrent reading of the NGDPs and the Vision 2050, we will simply answer this question in the negative. Though select aims and objectives of the Vision 2050 align with the intentions of the NGDPs, it is also obvious that the approaches to development and proposed strategies to realize the advancement of the condition or welfare of Papua New Guineans are contrastingly radical on the part of the Vision 2050.

Whereas the NGDPs envisaged the holistic and communal basis on which development ought to be undertaken, the Vision 2050 proposes a model of development that drives a neo-liberal agenda and focuses inadvertently on a market-driven approach to dealing with development in PNG. We anticipate that the unregulated implementation of the Vision 2050 will be disruptive to the social fabric of the PNG communal society and perpetuate growing disparities and powerlessness in the country. In all, it seems there is a markedly radical re-interpretation of the intentions of the NGDPs in the framing of the Vision 2050.

Two legal scholars note that the emphasis of the National Constitution of PNG, and its NGDPs in the Preamble promoted a “paradigm of development in which the value of human rights and dignity, democracy and participation, egalitarianism, self-reliance and autonomy were regarded of equal or greater importance than economic growth” (Ghai and Regan, 1992: 6). The language of Vision 2050 is predominantly the other way round; where economic growth and its trick-down effects are the measure of development.

An illustration of the trickle-down assumptions in the Vision 2050 is that “Economic growth under the four described scenarios will provide the means for the Government to deliver on its seven pillar activities. In turn, improved infrastructure, human resource development, improved health and educational facilities and institutions and improved life expectancy will empower the people of Papua New Guinea, to be wise, fair, smart, healthy and happy” (GoPNG, 2010: 28).

On this basis, there are four fundamental reasons on which we think the NGDPs are not reflected in the Vision 2050. We will qualify this assertion by engaging with the text of both documents in the following sections of this analysis. An exercise of this nature will naturally involve a literal reading

²¹ The 7 Pillars as identified in the Vision 2050 are: Human Capital Development, Gender, Youth and People Empowerment; Wealth Creation; Institutional Development and Service Delivery; Security and International Relations; Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change; Spiritual, Cultural and Community Development; and Strategic Planning, Integration and Control.

of the Vision 2050 and the text of the NGDPs. The reasons we believe the NGDPs are not reflected in the Vision 2050 are as follows:

- First, the Vision 2050 envisages an export-oriented economy, with emphasis in pursuing a neo-liberal agenda where free trade and the inevitable unregulated control on global capital is promoted (as opposed to NGDPs # 3 – National Sovereignty and Self-reliance),
- Second, the freeing up of land – a source of communal solidarity and social identity is part of the Vision 2050s take-off strategy (as opposed to NGDPs # 4- Natural Resources and Environment and NGDPs # 3 – National Sovereignty and Self-reliance),
- Third, the “cascading effect” of the Vision 2050 is hierarchical and stifles local initiative (as opposed to NGDPs # 5 – Papua New Guinean Ways) and,
- Finally, progress or development is measured with the disempowering indices and therefore inconsistent with PNG’s lived realities (as opposed to NGDPs #1 – Integral Human Development – Liberation and Fulfilment).

2.2.1. An Export-Oriented Model Underpinned by the Extractive Sector

In the “Directional and Enabling Statements”, the Vision 2050’s consistencies with the National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDPs) is endorsed. Though the 5 NDGPs are acknowledged as the guiding principle for the Vision 2050, there is an additional Guiding Principle that is proposed in the Vision 2050 (GoPNG, 2010:2).

The NSPT, “[T]aking into account the emerging global economic trends, Vision 2050 seeks to position Papua New Guinea in the global environment in order to maximize its comparative and competitive advantages, thereby including an additional “*Guiding Principle No. 6 — Papua New Guinea Is Progressive and Globally Competitive*”. It is apparent in the wording in this section of the Vision 2050 that NSPT envisages that a 6th National Goal and Directive Principle be included – PNG must aspire to be a “Progressive and Globally Competitive” economy. The addition of a 6th guiding principle to the development aspirations of PNG is worth dwelling on in this analysis. In its efforts to promote PNG as a “conducive business environment”, the Vision 2050 proposes that:

“Trade liberalization, preceded by domestic structural reforms, will result in lowering the cost of doing business and will lead to efficiency and higher productivity. Local industries, and the manufacturing industry, in particular, have been vocal about this. This is a challenge that needs to be urgently addressed” (GoPNG, 2010:23).

Pillar Four of the Vision 2050 – Security and International Relations is “responsible for creating an environment that is conducive for robust regional and international trade relations” (GoPNG, 2010: 40). There are other aspects of the Vision 2050 that are attuned to the “emerging global economic trends”.

The export-oriented incentives for manufacturing are also evident in the overall framework of the Vision 2050. In 2010, a report by the World Trade Organization entitled *Trade policy review report by Papua New Guinea* endorsed the Vision 2050. According to the World Trade

Organization report, the Vision 2050 demonstrates the “growing interests in Papua New Guinea on environmentally-friendly and sustainable trade, with a particular focus on sustainable agriculture, forestry and fisheries” (p.11). Tailoring domestic policies and strategies to deal with global and regional opportunities is reflected in the crafting of the Vision 2050.

The Vision 2050’s Directional and Enabling Statements are explicit about key prerequisites for a growth-oriented economy; among other things, “tariff reduction”, “increased trade” and “land reform” (GoPNG, 2010:4). This unrestrained, open-ended outward orientation in economic development is contradictory to the parameters set out in the NGDPs.²²

The Constitutional Planning Committee envisaged through the NGDPs that a strong and vibrant indigenous development model should ultimately propel Papua New Guinea towards global competitiveness. Papua New Guineans should be strong and competitive domestically as a matter of national priority, prior to any external undertaking in its international trade and economic relations. In the literal interpretation of the intentions of the Constitutional Planning Committee, the outward expansion of PNG’s international competitiveness must be reflective of the domestic strength of its indigenous entrepreneurial capacity. The reason why the Constitutional Planning Committee espoused the need for domestic consolidation of economic development for PNG is that local ownership of economic activities and a thriving domestic market will naturally enhance its then new-found political sovereignty.

The National Goal and Directive Principle Number 3 (*National Sovereignty and Self-reliance*) are explicitly clear about the correlations between economic sovereignty and political sovereignty. In fact the Constitutional Planning Committee observed that:

“If Self-government and Independence are to have real meaning these milestones must be accompanied by a substantial measure of control by Papua New Guinea over economic enterprises throughout the country. In the present circumstances this can only be achieved by developing solidarity between all peoples within the country and giving second place to relationships with outsiders. *It may well be that it will be necessary for us to forego some immediate material benefits which might be derived from dealings with outsiders, in order to enhance our own political sovereignty*” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2 para. 65 [emphasis ours]).

It is worth noting here that the NGDPs did not just spontaneously enter the national discourse. It was the outcome of serious consultations right on the eve of political independence²³ and in part

²² Through stringent controls, the NGDPs sought to insulate Papua New Guineans from the exploitation that is inevitable in foreign economic trade relations, and especially with foreign investors. See Constitutional Planning Committee Report Chapter 2, paras. 71 – 72.

²³ “We did not determine these national goals in a matter of days or weeks. We have distilled them after a great deal of thought and discussion over the twenty-two months during which our Committee has been at work. During that time, as we have mentioned in our Introduction, we held well over one hundred public meetings in all parts of the country, and we received thousands of submissions, verbally and in writing, many of which were concerned either directly or indirectly, with the type of society we should seek to build for ourselves” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para 10).

an elaboration of visions postulated by the then Chief Minister, Mr. Michael Thomas Somare (now Sir). In the Directional and Enabling Statements of the 2050 document, there is specific reference to the Eight Point Plan²⁴ (Somare, 1974). Emphasizing the empowering aspect of indigenous initiatives Somare's Eight Point Plan amongst others proposed "Self-reliance" as the basis for national development planning.

In 1974 when the Constitutional Planning Committee submitted the Constitutional Planning Committee Report, the Eight Improvement Aims formed the basis of the NGDPs. The Constitutional Planning Committee made it plainly clear that the NGDPs "are broader and more comprehensive than the Aims [Eight Improvement Aims] in that they provide for the full development of our people, whereas the Aims emphasize the economic aspects of our society" (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para.9).

It is therefore on the basis of our reading of the historical progression of this national development thinking that an inward-looking model of development was proposed and given effect to in the NGDPs. The intention of these NGDPs was economic empowerment and economic sovereignty for Papua New Guineans. The Constitutional Planning Committee intended for PNG to consolidate its economic activities, primarily in the hands of indigenous Papua New Guineans.

Any outward expansion in terms of opening up for foreign investments can be progressive and subjected to the domestic conditions of local entrepreneurial strength. This NGDPs was also reaffirmed in the fifth Improvement Aim which called for "a more self-reliant economy, less dependent for its needs on imported goods and services and better able to meet the needs of its people through local production" (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 7).

The Constitutional Planning Committee did not propose an export-oriented model of economic development. Nor did it propose all aspects of development to be tailored towards meeting the expectations of a global economic system. The strength of PNG's global competitiveness must first be seen in its domestic innovation and capacity to enrich first and foremost, the dignity of its citizens. That is a precondition that is continuously reinforced by the Constitutional Planning Committee.²⁵ It therefore begs the question about the model of development that the Vision 2050 espouses, and whether the Vision 2050 will empower Papua New Guineans.

Opening up of the PNG market in attempts to stay globally competitive can be beneficial in the short-term; however this may be at the expense of local development, at the dignity of its citizens

²⁴ Somare, M. (1974) We Bilong yumi-et poin impruvmen plen/toktok bilong Namba Wan Minista Michael Somare, em bin givim lon Ekonomik Sosaiti bilong Papua NiuGini long Port Moresby

²⁵ For instance under the NGDPs # 3 – National Sovereignty and Self-reliance (para.5), "The entry and use of foreign investment capital must be subordinate to the goal of national sovereignty and self-reliance and, in particular, be geared to internal social and economic policies, and to the integrity of the nation and its people". Likewise, the directive in paragraph 8 states:

"Papua New Guinea's sovereignty must not be undermined by political, economic or military dependence on foreign countries or foreign capital. In particular, no investment, military or foreign aid agreement or understanding should be entered into that imperils the self-reliance and self-respect of the people and state of Papua New Guinea, or their commitment to these national goals and directive principles, or which may lead to substantial dependence upon or influence by any single country, investor, lender or donor (or any group of countries, investors, lenders or donors)".

and more significantly the political sovereignty of the country. The local economic base that was intended to take-off through insightful integration of planning and decision-making in the intervening years after Independence was perhaps a lost opportunity to truly give effect to economic independence and political sovereignty.

Foreign investors if left unregulated will spell the inevitable loss of PNG's economic and political sovereignty (**Figure 2**). The Constitutional Planning Committee noted that:

"It is essential that we be highly selective as to the type of enterprise we allow into this country - not only should we very carefully consider whether the industry which a foreign company proposes to establish is in accordance with our national objectives, but we should thoroughly investigate the history of the company's activities in other countries. *We must not allow any foreign enterprise to operate in our country unless we can be sure that it will fully abide by our laws, and will not make any attempt to interfere with our political and civic affairs*" (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para.73) (emphasis ours).



Figure 2: The prophetic words of the Constitutional Planning Committee are made manifest in present-day dealings with foreign investors (Source: *The National*, Monday, June 29th, 2015, page 7).

2.2.2. Freeing up customary land for development

The Vision 2050 is explicit about land reforms. The national agenda on land reforms in the Vision 2050 follow on from the 2005 landmark PNG Land Reform Program undertaken under the supervision of the National Research Institute (NRI). Dr. Puka Temu, then Minister for Lands and Physical Planning oversaw the PNG Land Reform Program.²⁶ Coincidentally Dr. Puka Temu, in 2009 was Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Vision 2050's National Planning Committee.

In 2005, Dr. Temu as Minister for Lands and Physical Planning in acknowledging the need to free up customary land for development purposes states:

“The need to reform the institutions that define, enforce, and administer property rights over land – with a view to converting Papua New Guinea’s vast land resources into assets.....Undertaking these reforms appealed to me as the basis for sustainably transforming the welfare of Papua New Guineans living in the urban, peri-urban, and rural sectors. The customary land tenure system, which administers over 97 percent of the total land in Papua New Guinea, was sufficient for supporting us in so-called subsistence affluence. *But such livelihoods condemned Papua New Guineans to living in a twenty-first-century museum. My vision was for every Papua New Guinean to enjoy the living standards taken for granted in the developed economies.* My starting point was to empower Papua New Guineans to use what God has given them – land – to carve out a future of sustained improvements in welfare across the generations” (Temu, 2010:vii) (emphasis ours).²⁷

Dr. Temu’s views are condescending of the agrarian nature of PNG society as defined by the Constitutional Planning Committee. Note also that in Dr. Temu’s views, Papua New Guineans ought to aspire for the living standards enjoyed by citizens in developed economies.²⁸ But how did the Constitutional Planning Committee envisage PNG society? And are the strategies employed in the Vision 2050 (land reforms) consistent with these intentions of the Constitutional Planning Committee?

In their characterization of PNG society, the Constitutional Planning Committee concluded that “since we [Papua New Guineans] are a rural people, our strength should be essentially the land and the use of our innate artistic talents” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para.116). The Constitutional Planning Committee merely reinforced the belief that land,

²⁶ What came out of this Program was the stated “need to ensure that all land with formal titles, either on land owned by customary land owning social units or by the State was secure enough to be utilized as collateral for loans from the mainstream financial sector” (Yala, 2010:2).

²⁷ Temu, Puka (2010) “Forward – Hon. Puka Temu”, in Yala, Charles (ed.), *The Genesis of the Papua New Guinea Land Reform Program – Selected papers from the 2005 National Land Summit*, Port Moresby: National Research Institute, pp. vii – viii.

²⁸ Of course the Vision 2050 aspires to transform PNG into a “middle income economy” and be situated in the top 50 of the HDI ranking. Dr. Temu’s views about the envisaged destination for the Vision 2050 were framed earlier in his role as the Minister for Lands and Physical Planning.

notwithstanding its economic potential continues to provide a safety net for the vast majority of Papua New Guineans (cf. Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para.47) and must be protected to ensure the continuity of the socio-cultural identities of Papua New Guineans.

If customary land ownership relegates Papua New Guineans to “living in a twenty-first-century museum” as Dr. Puka Temu would want us to believe, then there is simply no consistency in his views. In 2009, Dr. Puka Temu in his official capacity as Minister for National Planning oversaw the writing up of the Vision 2050, a national vision that gives an encouraging view of PNG’s cultural heritage:

“We owe it to future generations to preserve our uniquely diverse cultures and traditions. Our cultures and traditions identify our uniqueness in the world. Principles and values that are embedded in our *time-tested cultures* also need to be captured, emulated, and passed on to future generations” (GoPNG, 2010: 41) (emphasis ours).

The “time-tested cultures” of a predominantly agrarian society as PNG²⁹ relies on communal ownership of land that has prevented “the emergence of a class of landless people as has occurred in so many other developing countries” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 48). The agrarian life-style (“twenty-first century museum”) of PNG as in other parts of Melanesia has been the basis of communal societies’ social security in times of uncertainty in the formal economic sector.³⁰ Contrary to Susan Windybank and Mike Manning’s (2003) prognosis that the “safety net of subsistence farming and the local economy.....appears to be disintegrating”, the global economic uncertainties in latter part of the 2000s had minimal impact on PNG – a society characterized as having a “large proportion of the population living in rural areas, and depending almost entirely on subsistence agricultural, hunting, and fishing economies” (Mellam and Rao, n.d.).

The NSPT also projects a progressive implementation of the Vision 2050 in the first 10 ten years, 2010 to 2020 under four scenarios. The four scenarios outlined in the PNG Vision 2050 will seek to diversify the economic base of the PNG economy. It is assumed that if implemented, the mass-based sectors of the economy will naturally expand and be inclusive, providing an alternative to income-opportunities for Papua New Guineans.

²⁹The Kuk Valley in the Western Highlands of PNG is the oldest known agricultural site in PNG with carbon dated material dating back 10,000 years ago. The work of one anthropologist Dr. John Muke propelled the Kuk site to its status as a UNESCO-listed heritage site. The agrarian society that continues is the same lifestyle that has for tens of thousands of years been administered under the customary land tenure system, a “time-tested” example of indigenous land administration that has outlasted even those in literate societies!

³⁰ For instance, the global recession of 2009 revealed the fallacy of absolute faith on growth-oriented “solutions” to the problems of Melanesia. Ralph Regenvanu revealed how “Vanuatu’s 220,000 people had been largely unaffected by the global financial crisis – because they did not belong to the modern economy”. He cited statistics to show that 80 percent of ni-Vanuatu “lived in the traditional village economy, while even the rest – including his Port Vila constituents – rely on tradition and kinship for food, work exchanges and dispute settlement” (McDonald, 2009). So perhaps for the majority of Melanesians it is preferable in this case to live in a “twenty-first century museum” (to use Dr. Temu’s words), rather than be “twenty-first century scavengers” on one’s own land.

We have covered in detail the four scenarios in Part 1 of this analysis. In this discussion, Scenario Two is relevant as it emphasizes on Land Reform. The Vision 2050 under Scenario Two directs that “Land Reform is undertaken starting in 2010”. The Vision 2050 is adamant that if:

“three percent more of customary land is brought into production in the formal sector, the economy is projected to grow at an additional 1.2 percent each year on average. This scenario will empower our people to participate in income-generating activities through cultivation of their land. This will lead to broad-based economic growth and ensure balanced development in rural and urban areas” (GoPNG, 2010:26).

This agenda of land reforms is specific about the need for a further 3 per cent of customary land to come into production in the formal sector. According to the Vision 2050, between the years 2010 to 2020 “decision makers should not relent in their push for land reform, as the multiplier effects of such a reform would reverberate throughout the country past the life-span of the LNG project” (GoPNG, 2010:26).

The anticipated land reforms, if undertaken successfully will contribute to the growth in PNG’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from “K9.7 [in 2010] to K12.5 billion [in 2020], which is an increase of K2.8 billion” (GoPNG, 2010:4). Mass participation in economic ventures by citizens is the anticipated outcome of the land reform exercise and is considered a critical precondition.³¹

The methodology used by Fairhead et al. (2010) in calculating the anticipated growth of the PNG economy under the land reform scenarios for the most part fed into the estimates of the Vision 2050’s Scenario Two (GoPNG, 2010: 28). However the economic modelling exercise used by Fairhead et al. (2010) has ever since been debunked as empirically flawed (Anderson, 2013). It throws into question the integrity of the projected economic growth rate estimated in the Vision 2050’s Scenario Two. But there are also associated costs of land reforms that are unanticipated in the Vision 2050’s Scenario Two projections.

The model used by Fairhead et al. (2010) disregards the “economic value of subsistence production and ‘social exchange’, and the apparent failure to properly incorporate commercial exchange in domestic markets” (Anderson, 2013: 8). Not only are there flaws in the methods of economic modelling that informs the Scenario Two projections of Vision 2050, the associated costs of a land-driven agro-industrialization process need to be factored into the overall Vision 2050 as well.

³¹ No doubt there are associated issues with this agenda and especially when the debacle at the Department of Lands and Physical Planning in the administration of the Special Agricultural Business Leases (SABL) is a recurring challenge. In the Vision 2050 specific commitments are made where the Vision 2050 will provide guidelines to the Department of Lands and Physical Planning “in order to implement land reform programs and explore ways of making landholding more conducive to promoting economic development” (NSPT, 2010:49). There is also a very critical need to reform the Department of Lands and Physical Planning so that accountability mechanisms are maintained. Public officials in this particular department need extensive ethical scrutiny in how they conduct their activities given the notoriety associated with the SABL-related controversy (see Filer, 2011).

The practice of land acquisition for agricultural purposes has been fraught with anomalies. Colin Filer (2011) provides alarming details about the total amount of land that is now in the hands of national and foreign corporate entities.³² The dislocative effects of unregulated land reforms will spell disaster for food security and the economic sovereignty of agrarian societies in PNG. Disturbingly, since 2003, “more than 10% of Papua New Guinea’s landmass has been handed over to foreign and national corporate interests under 99 year Special Agricultural and Business Leases (SABLs)” (Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2011:2). Whilst the Vision 2050 designates a timeframe of 10 years for the freeing up of 3 percent of land for development purposes, the SABL scheme has seen to it that this goal is already “ahead of schedule” with 12 percent of the country (5.5. million hectares of land) now in the hands of foreign corporations (Mousseau, 2013:3).

The fear is that these mostly unscrupulous acts of land-grabbing are designated “for oil palm plantations....[where denying]...access to customary farming land damages rural food systems, as livelihoods are lost and access to alternate income opportunities...” (Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2011:2). Whilst the mass-based sector of the agriculture sector is the purported beneficiary of land reforms in the Vision 2050, the reality is that the agricultural output from ventures associated with land acquisition tend to favour the expansion of export-oriented “monocultures (like oil palm)”, which in turn are “likely to reduce the diversity of local [food] production” (Anderson, 2013: 13).

Elaborate schemes for purposes of boosting an export-based agriculture sector can be undertaken at the expense of local food security if monocultures are the perceived agriculture production choice. Fairbairn (1985) warns that the implications of subsistence skills loss are inevitable outcome of industrial development. The heavy involvement in industrial development in general can lead to many traditional skills in agriculture being lost or where subsistence resources such as land is alienated or destroyed.

The communal ownership of land that has persisted for generations allows for the diversity of food crops and other agricultural commodities to be produced towards sustaining the predominantly rural-based communities in PNG. Given the high costs of imported and manufactured foodstuff, and the growing epidemic of lifestyle diseases due to the mass importation of cheap low-quality imported foodstuff, cultivating any sense self-reliance can be demonstrated first and foremost in the subsistence sector. Customary ownership of land or the promotion of subsistence-based land use needs to be considered in that light (see Mousseau, 2013).

The Constitutional Planning Committee was not promoting a romanticized view of land. Customary ownership of land guarantees economic sovereignty and community vitality. A recent study conducted by Dr. Tim Anderson (2015) supports the view that one need not register land to engage meaningfully in the cash economy. The agriculture sector can sustain “hybrid livelihoods”, where diversification of food crops and cash crops can enhance the income-earning opportunities of Papua New Guineans. The Constitutional Planning Committee rightly pinned

³²According to Filer (2011), “Between the beginning of July 2003 and the end of January 2011, almost 5 million hectares of customary land (11 percent of PNG’s total land area) has passed into the hands of national and foreign corporate entities through a legal mechanism known as the ‘lease-leaseback scheme’ (p.2).

the intentions of economic self-reliance and economic sovereignty to Papua New Guinean control of their land and labor.

2.2.3. The “cascading effect” of the Vision 2050

When the Constitutional Planning Committee instituted the NGDPs, they envisaged that these development goals be incorporated into the formal planning processes of the instrumentalities of State. Section 25 (2) of PNG’s Constitution (*“Implementation of the National Goals and Directive Principles”*), states that: “it is the duty of all governmental bodies to apply and give effect to them as far as lies within their respective powers”.

The NGDPs were made to be easily accessible and communicated widely. The question of collective ownership of the NGDPs was made explicit in the Constitutional Planning Committee Report. In the words of the words of the Constitutional Planning Committee:

“We consider that they [NGDPs] should be given the widest possible publicity at all levels of government; in towns and villages; in schools and tertiary institutions; in churches and other organizations so that our people will become fully aware of them, discuss them and obtain a clear sense of the direction in which our country is heading. *It should give each man and woman a clear appreciation of the need for him or her to participate fully in the building of our new nation - a nation which is firmly based on equality and social justice.*” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 12) (emphasis ours)

This directive proposes that the NGDPs to be ultimately owned by all Papua New Guineans and be made accessible. Since schools and tertiary institutions are the means of preparing citizens for citizenship, the dissemination of the NGDPs in these institutions is of paramount importance. It implies too that “each man and woman” are mobilized and empowered to make the NGDPs a reality. There is a stark difference between the Vision 2050 and the NGDPs. Whilst the Vision 2050 delegates the task of implementation to the institutions of State, in a top-down approach, the NGDPs were intended to be part of the world-view of all citizens in the pursuit of national development.

What is referred to as the “cascading manner” basically entails the hierarchical status of the Vision 2050. From the Vision 2050, “the Long Term Development Strategy should first take its cue from the mission statement of Vision 2050; sectoral strategies should in turn develop their visions from the LTDS mission statement; Provincial Development Strategies will likewise derive their visions from that of the LTDS; Districts, LLGs and Wards would then develop operating plans to implement the strategies of high order plans” (GoPNG, 2010: 59). In this very elaborate structure of planning and coordinating development strategies, the ultimate aim is for stakeholders to conform to the overall Vision 2050. But is this an empowering approach to dealing with inclusive development in PNG?

We are also given insights into the rationale for the creation of the Vision 2050. In the three decades of PNG’s existence as an independent State, one of the lessons learnt is that “Papua New

Guineans must have noble values and positive attitudes and learn to become powerful forces and change agents for development and nation building” (GoPNG, 2010:2). Is the Vision 2050 making reference to new values that need to be acquired? Or is the Vision 2050 exhorting Papua New Guineans to learn the same values and attitudes that were always present in the NGDPs?

For instance the Constitutional Planning Committee were adamant that “we seek to promote our traditional ways such as participation, consultation and consensus and a willingness of privileged persons to voluntarily forgo benefits to enable those who are less privileged to have a little more” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 106).

These are time-tested values that guided the Constitutional Planning Committee in their formulation of the NGDPs. If anything the Vision 2050 is ambiguous about these values. A reading of the NGDPs Number 2 (*Equality and Participation*) provides insights into the empowering features of local governance. According to NGDPs 2 (8), opportunities must be “provided to ensure that any citizen can exercise his personal creativity and enterprise in pursuit of fulfillment that is consistent with the common good, and for no citizen to be deprived of this opportunity because of the predominant position of another”. The Constitutional Planning Committee was very familiar with the centralized system of government under the Australian colonial administration, and the effect it had on local initiative. For instance:

“Most local government councils have not been able to provide a satisfactory avenue for the people's participation in their own development, as the councils have been dominated by the central administration for many years, and thus had much of their initiative and energy sapped” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, 1974, para. 43).

The Vision 2050 is framed in such a way that it does not allow for locally inspired models of framing development initiatives. The whole idea about participation is where local level governments determine their own priorities and use the contextually-based resources and know-how to implement such initiatives. These self-starting aspect to developments is not allowed for in the scheme of the Vision 2050. The conformist expectations of Vision 2050 therefore reduce Papua New Guineans to mere spectators and perhaps dependents on national-level technical knowhow and expertise. What the Constitutional Planning Committee had in mind was that there is no predetermined, pre-packaged “avenue for the people’s participation in their own government”.³³

However it is increasingly becoming self-evident that there is no national ownership of the Vision 2050 – an important prerequisite required for the facilitating of the “cascading effect” linking the

³³The Constitutional Planning Committee rightly warned that: “Development must take place through our people. It must be a process. It must not be a prefabricated, predetermined set of answers, formulae and solutions by foreigners to the problems and hopes we alone can feel and yearn for. Technology, scientific discoveries and institutions of the most recent times can, in many respects, be inappropriate for us. Proper development should take place through institutions and techniques that are not only meaningful to us, but also recognize our human dignity and enhance it” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 102). Though the Vision 2050 is not developed by “foreigners”, it is obvious that the yardsticks to measure development are external to the worldviews of Papua New Guineans, and the Port Moresby-based machinery of government is disparately outside of the lived realities of the majority of Papua New Guineans.

majority of Papua New Guinean to the national vision. The majority of Papua New Guineans at the local-levels of government are still unsure of the existence of the Vision 2050 and its intended objectives (Figure 3).




Figure 3: The “cascading effect” is yet to take effect (Source: The National, Tuesday, June 9th, 2015, page 55).

2.2.4. Measuring development on whose terms?

The Vision 2050 is adamant that PNG “will focus all its efforts and will strive to achieve”, among other things, “rapid growth potential which can be realized in a reasonable time” (GoPNG, 2010, xiv). The growth model of development that is export-based in orientation is the leitmotif of the Vision 2050.

We argue that the development model espoused in the Vision 2050 is inconsistent with specific aspects of the NGDPs. There are two elements of the Vision 2050 that appear problematic in this instant. Firstly, the proposed strategies towards the realization of the Vision 2050 especially in human capital development appears disempowering to a largely rural-based society such as PNG. In other words, the PNG Ways do not feature in the Vision 2050. And secondly, the Vision 2050 promotes a measurement of development that is not consistent with the concept of integral human development in the NGDPs.

How is human development perceived in the Vision 2050?

In the first Pillar in the Vision 2050 calls for “Human Capital Development, Gender, Youth and People Empowerment”. The formal education bias is evident. In human capital development, the Vision 2050 calls on the education sector to “improve and increase access to the national high schools to produce students who will be trained in science subjects, such as chemistry, biology,

physics, geology, marine and environmental sciences, mathematics, English and be competitive in bidding for scholarships to study in Papua New Guinea and at overseas higher education institutions” (GoPNG, 2010:33).

Likewise, illiteracy in this instant is viewed in the Vision 2050 as detrimental to the aspirations of the Vision 2050 and access to the education system is seen as the viable approach to arresting the developmental challenge of illiteracy in PNG. However is illiteracy in the English language necessarily a disincentive for living productive lives?

The NGDP Number 5 (“Development through the use of Papua New Guinean Ways”) holds a holistic view of literacy in indigenous language (among other forms of cultural expressions) as a “positive strength” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, NGDP 5.3). It rightly elevates the use of indigenous language as a tool worthy of generating a wholesome and a dignified existence:

“There should be fostered a respect and appreciation for traditional ways of life and culture - including language - in all their richness and variety and a willingness to apply these ways dynamically and creatively for the tasks of development.³⁴ Literacy in local languages should not, however, be discouraged as they should be safeguarded from falling into disuse.” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 62).

Cultural education and the use of indigenous language have a place in development. We are very much informed in the Melanesian sub-region of the Pacific about the misdirected attention to a Western notion of literacy-based quantification of educational outcomes. Commenting on some of the underlying factors leading up to the 1998-2003 crisis in the Solomon Islands, an observer said that “[T]he bulk of Solomons youth has been schooled for non-existent urban jobs, effectively alienating them from their village resource base and branding them as failures in a system foreign to their lives” (Roughan 2000, cited in Chevalier, 2001:39).³⁵

One of the most inadvertent omissions in the Vision 2050 is the practical use of culture.³⁶ Whilst human resource development is promoted, culture, cultural expressions, and the indigenous arts

³⁴ At the regional level of the Pacific Islands (through the Secretariat of the Pacific Community) initiatives are underway to “look at culture more widely and the relationship between culture and economies”. The “Regional Culture Strategy” as formulated under the Pacific Plan of 2004 is being touted as a possible approach to use cultural resilience as a measurable indicator of development in the Pacific Islands (Cain and Huffer, 2014). Indeed, the discussions about the need for the inclusion of culture in mainstream development agenda are reflective of the visionary thinking and context-inspired experience of the Constitutional Planning Committee. PNG-oriented indicators to measure development are needed, based on the resilience of its cultural practices and values.

³⁵ With the Solomon Islands crisis in its education system, consider the views expressed by the Constitutional Planning Committee in NGDP 5.25: “We are concerned by the way in which in the past development and modern institutions have alienated our people from one another. Our schools have tended to make children strangers to their parents and their villages. Universities have furthered this process of alienation. At least until recently the whole education process was leading towards social stratification, increased difficulty in communication among members of a single social group, and a decline in the level of tolerance and inter-personal respect among our people.”

³⁶ It is worth noting that under the Vision 2050’s Pillar 6 - Spiritual, Cultural and Community Development – though “Culture” is highlighted as a priority sector; there is nothing specific in this sector about utilizing culture for development. The NSPT merely provide a pessimistic view of the resilience of culture: “The current generation

and languages are not cited as critical aspects of development through the Vision 2050. Though the Vision 2050 lauds the “Principles and values that are embedded in our time-tested cultures” (GoPNG, 2010: 41), it vaguely directs “all institutions are to align their programs and systems to re-engineer a learning process to instill a holistic human capital asset” (ibid.).

It is worth highlighting here the experience of Vanuatu – another Melanesian country (**Figure 4**). The Vanuatu Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs in 2012 “completed a pilot study on well-being which measures happiness and considers variables that reflect Melanesian values” (Alicka Vuti, in Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, 2012: i). In this alternative approach to defining individual and community well-being, “three unique domains of well-being” are utilized to measure the state of well-being for ni-Vanuatu citizens – “resource access, cultural practice, and community vitality” (ibid.). The ni-Vanuatu experience in defining how development should be measured demonstrates creativity and an empowering exercise in bringing to the fore Melanesian-oriented aspects of life in a predominantly agrarian and communal society. One will also notice that access to customary land and literacy in indigenous language are privileged as realistic indicators in measuring the level of happiness in a Melanesian context.



Figure 4: Vanuatu is at the forefront of using culture and Melanesian-defined indicators to measure national well-being (Source: Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, 2012).

seems to have lost respect for our culture and traditions” (GoPNG, 2010:43). In the entire text of the Vision 2050, “culture” or the indigenous languages of PNG receive no specific attention in terms of specific strategies. We only get to read how culture should be preserved and how it defines us as Papua New Guineans because of its “time-tested” characteristic (GoPNG, 2010: 41).

In hindsight when the Constitutional Planning Committee was writing the NGDPs, a significant proportion of Papua New Guineans had not undergone education in the formal education system. Literacy and other aspects of measuring educational qualifications in the formal education system were still unheard of. But the Constitutional Planning Committee recognized that one need not be schooled or qualified in the formal education system to be an agent of change in his or her community. All were directed to:

“Making the best use of the talents of our people, in the interests of the nation, is clearly of the highest importance. Particularly at our present stage of development when skills among Papua New Guineans which can usefully be applied to the modern "sector of productive activity are scarce, we need to channel those skills into activities which will most affectively promote the welfare of our people. At the same time, the skills of the people in all kinds of traditional activities should be encouraged and further developed (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 91).

Acknowledging and recognizing the innate talents and skills of Papua New Guineans, the Constitutional Planning Committee directed that such talents be utilized to promote a context-based model of development for PNG. Unlike the Vision 2050, there is indeed no single pathway to living an enriching and fulfilling life because the diversity of PNG is a “positive aspect” worthy of being harnessed.³⁷ This directive carries with it an empowering and inclusive tone for national mobilization.³⁸ Unlike the formal education system that churns out disillusioned, frustrated and culturally displaced citizens, the emphasis on utilization of skills, both traditional and modern is encouraged.

The Vision 2050’s acknowledgement of PNG’s cultural heritage is however diminished when one considers how it promotes the notion of “[T]rade liberalisation, preceded by domestic structural reforms” aimed as “lowering the cost of doing business and will lead to efficiency and higher productivity” (GoPNG, 2010: 23). How is this directive by the Vision 2050 inconsistent with the aims of intentions of the Constitutional Planning Committee in the NGDPs?

The proposal in the Vision 2050 must be considered against the Constitutional Planning Committee’s learned interpretation of the United Nations commissioned report entitled "Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and International Relations", published in 9 June, 1974. In 1974, the Constitutional Planning Committee extensively cite from this United Nations report to bring home the point about the need to support the resilience of the social fabric of PNG society against the pervasive and destructive elements of global capitalism.³⁹

³⁷ Cf., Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 34: “We recognize that people are not born equal either in the talents they possess or in their determination to use them to the best of their ability. But everyone should have an equal chance to develop the talents he or she has whether they be in farming, teaching, the arts, technology or in any other field of human activity”.

³⁸ Ultimately, “The total development of all our people, largely through their own efforts, should be our aim” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 89).

³⁹ The United Nation’s report warns for example that “the ‘business culture’, with its emphasis on efficiency, may be considered too impersonal in traditional societies. The very cultural identity and the entire social fabric may be at stake,

On the basis of the UN report of 1974, the Constitutional Planning Committee directed that “the preservation of national sovereignty and integrity is crucial to our country's future well-being and that the Government must take a strong stand now to restrict the flow of foreign capital into our country if we are not to be overwhelmed by the influence of excessive foreign investment” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 85).

In the second aspect of this discussion on the manner development ought to be measured we consider the Vision 2050's use of the Human Development Index (HDI). The growing obsession with time-bound and quantifiable targets for measuring progress is in vogue in global development thinking. Quantifying development indicators has been a recurring theme for multilateral and donor agencies in recent decades. From the external environment, this is perhaps a good starting point to contextualizing the Vision 2050.

Ideas about the need for timeframes and set targets have evidently influenced development planning by governments in developing countries such as PNG. The most unprecedented attempt on a global scale was of course the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), reached through what is known as the Millennium Declaration.⁴⁰ Within a period of 15 years (2000 to 2015), eight goals were framed. Governments had to commit their countries to working towards achieving these eight MDGs in the year 2015.

On December 20, 2004, the PNG's National Executive Council (NEC) formally approved the first MDG PNG Country Progress Report. Sir Michael Somare in acknowledging this Report claimed that PNG “has tailored all global targets as well as most of the indicators associated with the MDGs to reflect the realities and priorities of the country” (Somare, 2004:i). The modified targets and indicators were of course included in what is now known as the Medium Term Development Strategy or MTDS 2005-2010.

We get an indication here of the manner in which “global targets/ranking” effectively puts on notice governments in fulfilling their domestic commitments to global developmental goals. Moreover the PNG government has taken on board the idea that its meeting these developmental priorities has to be assessed on the terms introduced by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. The operational strategy of the Vision 2050 is specific about PNG's performance in relation to international benchmarks: “Vision 2050 Development Indicators will be prepared to enable the evaluation of its progress and compatibility with nationally and globally agreed goals” (GoPNG, 2010: 56).

In the implementation of the MDGs, the year 2010 was identified as the “start of a five-year countdown to the 2015 target date for achieving the MDGs, which includes halving poverty and hunger, arresting diseases and environmental degradation, helping babies survive infancy and

especially if multinational corporations attempt to transplant their own models of social development to the host country” (cited in the CPC Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 81).

⁴⁰ According to Poku and Whitman (2011), the “Millennium Declaration holds out the promise of a new pattern of global social policy built on the foundations of greater equity, social justice and respect for human rights. More fundamentally it reflects the shared aspirations of the global human community in a period of sweeping change” (pp.3-4).

educating them in childhood” (Poku and Whitman, 2011:4). PNG will not meet the targets set out in the MDG.

So essentially the global expectations for PNG were unrealistic, and the Vision 2050 is seen here as PNG’s excuse for its failure towards achieving the MDGs. What the Vision 2050 represents is a deferring of the target date by an extended 40 years (2010-2050). It is an abject admission on the part of the PNG government that timeframes used in the measurement of performances in meeting global initiatives are unattainable, even by the standards imposed from its multilateral development partners.

Hence, the PNG Vision 2050 was launched in the year 2009. Perhaps the legacy of this 15 year experiment with the MDG was that it initiated the current obsession in the quantification of development through time frames and development indicators and generated the interest in having a “home-grown” vision for the nation.

However this manner of measuring global development has been roundly criticized. In the Dili Conference (February 26th to 28th, 2013), the 48 countries represented in the Conference used the occasion to issue the Dili Consensus⁴¹ wherein they expressed the sentiments thus:

“We know that many of us will not achieve most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We know that the well-being of our people depends upon the achievement of outcomes that were not adequately reflected in the MDGs, most notably in the areas of peace and justice and climate change” (The *Dili Consensus*, February 2013).

The Dili Consensus illustrates the problematic and uncritical use of unrealistic global development yardsticks in ascertaining the overall well-being of human beings across the diverse landscape of the international community. As the Dili Consensus articulates clearly well, global yardsticks may not capture equally important alternative development indicators of countries (see for instance, Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2013).⁴²

Failure to achieve set standards by multilateral institutions may also have the adverse effect of rendering countries “failures”. Privileging externally-driven development priorities may also be counterproductive to home-grown initiatives. This does not auger well for countries that may need to mobilize their local capacities. So indeed, when we consider how global measurements are used in the context of development and performances by countries, it is imperative that local developmental priorities and the creative response to national development challenges are measured on their own terms, rather than being made to conform to global or regional expectations. It gives a certain air of self-respect on the part of developing countries such as PNG to meet development expectations on their own terms, within their own lived realities.

That said, one will notice that the PNG’s successful attainment of the Vision 2050 is directly tied to a global ranking system – the Human Development Index (or HDI). The HDI was first

⁴¹ The Dili Consensus is available online at <http://www.g7plus.org/thedili-consensus/>

⁴² Pacific Institute of Public Policy (2013) “Blue marble: The Pacific in the post-2015 development agenda”, Port Vila

introduced by the United Nations Development Program in 1990.⁴³ In the Vision 2050 (p.5), a footnote provides the functional use of the HDI in its measurement of progress:

a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy); being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level); and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, and income), and gender equity in relation to these indices (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>).

Within the 40 year time frame in the implementation of the Vision 2050, PNG will aim to reach “middle income country status” and be situated in the top 50 of the HDI ranking. Table 1 in the Appendix gives a reading of the most recent top 50 countries as they stand in the 2014 HDI ranking. PNG in the year 2014 HDI ranking is placed on 157th position. Based on the 2014 ranking, PNG is ranked exactly 107 places outside of the 50th place in the HDI ranking schema.

Interestingly, a cursory glance at the 2014 HDI ranking and one will find that in the top 50 of the HDI ranking, almost half of the countries represented are European countries. In PNG’s bid to be in the top 50 of the HDI, PNG may well start thinking about learning and replicating the Europeans models of capitalism. This will inevitably mean a socio-cultural reorganization of its Melanesian persona.

In 2005, Dr. Temu,⁴⁴ the then Minister for Lands and Physical Planning in acknowledging the need to free up land for development aspired for “for every Papua New Guinean to enjoy the living standards taken for granted in the developed economies” (Temu, 2010:vii). This begs the question – aren’t there realistic performance indicators, grounded in PNG-oriented ways that we should measure our developmental indicators by?

It is worth diverging here. We have established that European societies dominate the top 50 of the HDI ranking in the year 2014. We know for a fact that most of these European countries have undergone significant transformations, spanning hundreds of years to the stage where they have acquired the status of post-industrial societies. Most of these countries were conditioned into shedding communalistic identities in favor of individualism to facilitate the kinds of expectations of their societies. In recent decades, mass consumerism has further ingrained itself as a lifestyle in these societies. How these countries have evolved over the hundreds of years of social and economic transformations has given rise to the kind of development model and development status they have attained to date.

⁴³ We are being reminded to be cautious in the use of the HDI as a measure of development, see for instance, Srinivasan (1994); Kelley (1991); McGillivray (1991)

⁴⁴In 2009 Dr. Puka Temu was Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Vision 2050’s National Planning Committee.

Is this the kind yardstick and social engineering the Vision 2050 aspires for a post-colonial Melanesian society, still mired in its communalistic and tribal elements?⁴⁵ The NGDPs is explicit about the primordial identities that define Papua New Guineans and their culture:

“Our ways emphasize the needs of the community. We exercise our rights in the context of our obligations to our community. We consider our village and tribal units as our greatest elements for common care and support. Modern corporations, companies and business houses in our country should use the "tribal spirit" to create a sense of solidarity and responsibility. In our village and tribal units, no-one is a master and no-one a servant, no-one is an employer and no-one an employee. Most of our societies are classless and egalitarian” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 118).

A fundamentally abrupt shift in cultural and social reorganization will need to take place if the top-50-HDI-ambitions of the Vision 2050 are indeed what PNG wants to achieve. Again the timeless NGDPs are worth reflecting on when aggressively pursuing developmental aspirations outside of Melanesian realities:

“We see the darkness of neon lights. We see the despair and loneliness in urban cities. We see the alienation of man from man that is the result of the present machine orientated economy. We see true social security and man's happiness being diminished in the name of economic progress. We caution therefore that large-scale industries should be pursued only after very careful and thorough consideration of the likely consequences upon the social and spiritual fabric of our people. Great emphasis, we believe, should be given to small-scale, artisan services and business activity. That man should live decently in conditions fitting to his dignity is an objective we cherish. We believe that that humanity can be achieved in simplicity. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that a significant number of people who live by the fruits of multi-million dollar multi-national corporations live in misery, loneliness and spiritual poverty” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 116).

There are some serious questions that ought to be considered in light of PNG's ambitions for the top 50 HDI ranking. For instance;

- What are the potential threats to the PNG social and cultural order in its attempts to emulate economic growth rates similar to the post-Industrial societies in Europe and Asia?
- How should the inevitable social and cultural disruptions be managed?⁴⁶

⁴⁵Marshall Sahlins (1992a) the great anthropologist reminds us that: “[for people to give up their culture they] must first learn to hate what they already have, what they have always considered their well-being. Beyond that, they have to despise what they are, to hold their own existence in contempt – and want, then, to be someone else” (p.24).

⁴⁶ Effectively, it is now a “race against time” to get into the top 50 of the HDI rank.

In summary the measurement of progress and development in the Vision 2050 does not resemble or define development as envisaged by the Constitutional Planning Committee.

2.2.5. To what extent does our “home-grown” National Goals # 1 to 5 and its subsequent Directive Principles of the PNG constitution captured in the PNG Vision 2050?

In the previous section of this analysis we focused primarily on the strategies outlined and employed in the Vision 2050. The Vision 2050 claims to be pursuing the intentions of the NGDPs; however the strategies employed in the Vision 2050 are markedly hostile to the intentions of the NGDPs. In fact, the Vision 2050 concedes to neo-liberal agendas in its stated guiding principle, and the subsequent strategies it promotes. There is no empowering effort to use PNG-oriented models of development, nor quantifying development in accordance with the original intent of the NGDPs.

In this section we look at where the Vision 2050 and NGDPs converge or complement each other in their stated objectives. To what extent is the NGDPs captured in the Vision 2050? Close examination of the Vision 2050 demonstrates that it captures certain aspirations stated in the NGDPs. However not all of the NGDPs intentions are truly captured in the Vision 2050. It is worth noting that the NGDPs is opposed to “theory of modernization, whereby developing countries were thought to best develop through dominant influence of a strong state establishing a market system and maintaining a rational bureaucracy with centralized planning” (Cox, 2004:61).

The NGDPs are “premised of social democratic ideals” (Narokobi, 2013) where the diffused, communal nature of PNG society allows for equitable process of development to be undertaken. In the NGDPs, the dependence on foreign capital is treated with a general sense of caution. In the words of the Constitutional Planning Committee:

“We believe strongly that the preservation of national sovereignty and integrity is crucial to our country's future well-being and that the Government must take a strong stand now to restrict the flow of foreign capital into our country if we are not to be overwhelmed by the influence of excessive foreign investment” (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 85).

We conclude that the Constitutional Planning Committee was not proposing an autarkic economic system for PNG. Rather, the Constitutional Planning Committee’s directive calls for some sense of vigilance when PNG is compelled to engage with the global economic system. For the preservation of PNG’s political sovereignty its economic sovereignty ought to be maintained at all times. Such is the internal logic and consistency of the NGDPs throughout.

2.2.6. Vision 2050 expands on the need for long-term strategic thinking

According to our tabulation of the objectives of the Vision 2050, and the directives of the NGDPs, (see Table: 2), the Vision 2050 takes on board a growing list of cross-cutting developmental

challenges. The emergent developmental challenges were unheard of in the time of the Constitutional Planning Committee. In the time period between 1972 and 1974 when the Constitutional Planning Committee were writing up the NGDPs PNG's demography was at around 2 million peoples. Most Papua New Guineans were still engaged in subsistence agriculture, with their lifestyles still less influenced by the formal cash economy. The upward mobility of the introduced Western education system had not taken roots in PNG. Urbanization as a phenomenon of development was still unheard of.

Likewise, PNG's affiliation to multilateral and regional institutions were only limited to the United Nations Organizations and other regional entities. In terms of the global agenda on development, it was aid, multinational corporations and foreign capital investments that were the mainstay of development jargon. In the days of the Constitutional Planning Committee, jargons such as "strategic management", "operational strategy", "strategic target goals", "public private partnership", and so forth were not topical rhetoric in public administration discourse.

The changes and on-going interactions between the PNG and other development stakeholders have given rise to changes in the application of concepts and practice of governance since the time of the Constitutional Planning Committee. The Vision 2050 sought to update development thinking, taking into account the nature of governance and administration in the 21st century.

Though the Constitutional Planning Committee were visionary in their articulation of the NGDPs, they recognized that as a "matter of our survival as a people" striking a balance between preserving "our identity and still keep abreast of the changing times" must be factored into national thinking (Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Chapter 2, para. 105). Reflective of the changing times, the Vision 2050 takes the cue from the appeal by the Constitutional Planning Committee to have long-term strategies for development in PNG.

On the eve of Independence, the Constitutional Planning Committee were adamant that, "We Papua New Guineans are now in the driving seat. The road which we should follow ought to be marked out so that all will know the way ahead" (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 4). This directive has been the rallying call for the Vision 2050 to be framed. Against the lessons learnt from 34 years of nation-building, the Vision 2050 is an effort to address the lost opportunities of the last three decades of political independence.

Under Pillar Seven ("Strategic Planning, Integration and Control"), the Vision 2050 outlines:

"the pathways forward to achieve progressive and systematic long-term planning and management of resources for real and sustainable nation building. This pillar will ensure that Papua New Guinea has sound, clear, achievable and progressive long-term policies and programs" (GoPNG, 2010:44).

Learning from the experience of the NGDPs, the Vision 2050 has instituted monitoring and evaluation criteria to enable "strategic reviews of major policy areas, works with central agencies and line agencies to promote strategic thinking, conducts regular strategic audits and monitors and evaluates the long-term Vision 2050".

2.2.7. Path to Equalization – Mass-based development

The Constitutional Planning Committee envisaged “the utilization of resource revenues to benefit all citizens, create equal opportunities for every man and woman to work and earn and income, and to benefit future generations” (Mawuli, 2010:2). Commenting on how the government ought to prioritize the revenues from the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Agogo Mawuli (ibid) proposes that the practical means to realize the “equalization or redistributive” intentions of the NGDPs “is to grow the economy, by promoting a broad-based growth that will lead to accelerated poverty reduction through minimizing the constraints to income enhancement and employment generation” (ibid.).

The Vision 2050 seeks to advance the intentions of the NGDPs by emphasizing the need for broad-based economic development. Through investing in the non-mining sectors of the economy, the majority of Papua New Guineans can participate meaningfully in income-earning opportunities.

The four scenarios outlined in the Vision 2050 (GoPNG, 2010: 25-28) are aimed ultimately at diversifying the economic sectors of the country. There is naturally an initiative here to invest in a non-mining alternative pathway for development in PNG. The PNG LNG project will be used as the basis to phasing out PNG’s dependence on the extractive sector of the economy. Ambitious as it is, Vision 2050 is explicit about the need to create a mass-based economy where manufacturing, eco-tourism, and so forth take over as the engines of economic growth in PNG. The LNG project will provide a temporary stimulus in the first ten years of the implementation of the Vision 2050.

The LNG project is considered in the Vision 2050 as critical to supporting the government’s “efforts to stabilise service delivery and infrastructure development” (GoPNG, 2010: 26). Whilst the LNG project is in operation, the simultaneous drive for land reforms will also be undertaken within the ten year period (2010 – 2020). The diversification of the structure of PNG’s economy is at play where the ultimate aim is to move away from the extractive sector. This is perhaps intentionally coherent with the NGDPs’ calls for self-reliance, equal distribution and participation.

However, whilst the intentions of the Vision 2050 are noble, in practice PNG continues to relentlessly go out of its way to solicit investors into the mining sector. One of the projects that have raised concerns from PNG civil society groups, the Solwara 1 sea-bed mining off the coast of the New Ireland province is a case in point.

It was reported in the *Post Courier* of June 30th (Tuesday) 2015 that the Mining Minister Byron Chan has given his approval of the seabed mining project – the first of its kind in the world (see **Figure 4**). Chan was quoted as saying that the PNG government “was improving its regulatory framework whilst at the same time ensuring that investment is sustained, promoted and encouraged and welcomed investors to assist the Government in broadening its extractive sector by diversifying its mineral base (Post Courier, June 30th, 2015, p.18).

These statements by Chan runs contrary to the intentions of the Vision 2050 which seeks to facilitate mass-based development “once strong growth has been achieved in the mining industries and the renewable resource-based exports, it is important to use that income to create more opportunities to grow the economy” (GoPNG, 2010:3). On the one hand the Vision 2050 compels government to draw down its dependence on the extractive sector, but on the other hand it continues to ensure that the mining sector is relentless in its activities.



Figure 5: Seabed mining is another example of the addictive dependence on mining as the basis for PNG's economic development pathway.

2.2.8. Agriculture makes an appearance in the Vision 2050

A critical sector that gets special attention in the Vision 2050 is the agriculture sector. The emphasis presently is on consolidating the implementation strategies for the National Agriculture Development Plan (NADP). In contrast, when the Constitutional Planning Committee first drew up the NGDPs, there was no explicit reference to the role the agriculture sector should play in the development of the livelihoods of Papua New Guineans. Of course agriculture was naturally and instinctively part and parcel of life in a rural society.

Land as it was perceived by Constitutional Planning Committee only served to enrich the identities and social well-being of Papua New Guineans. The Constitutional Planning Committee envisaged that land be jealously guarded, and where necessary deployed "to obtain a basic living,

quite apart from any involvement they [Papua New Guineans] may have in the cash economy” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 47).

But though the Vision 2050 deals with agriculture as a matter of sectoral priority, it lumps together agriculture with “downstream processing, enhanced manufacturing activity, improved infrastructure, delivery of goods and services”, and so forth in the Base Case Scenario (GoPNG, 2010:25).

However, given that 85 percent of Papua New Guineans are dependent on the agriculture sector, it would have been more empowering if the agriculture sector had remained a Pillar or Case Scenario on its own in the Vision 2050. As a Pillar or Case Scenario, the agriculture sector would have been given priority in the diversification of the economic structure of PNG. We are of the opinion that the Vision 2050’s attention to detail on land reforms (Scenario Two) and the LNG project (Scenario Three) or the 7 Pillars, whilst excluding agriculture is symptomatic of the lack of respect to the agrarian heritage of PNG and a lack of appreciation of the values that agriculture embody – namely, economic sovereignty and self-reliance.

Commercial agriculture should also be distinguished from subsistence agriculture. Subsistence agriculture is the backbone of the society. Non-market production on customary land facilitates the consolidation of social capital, the continuation of land ownership under customary tenure, and the guarantee of food security well into the foreseeable future. These non-monetary benefits of the subsistence sector far outweigh any econometric measurement of development.

The Constitutional Planning Committee recognized Papua New Guineans as a “rural people, our strength should be essentially the land”. Maintaining ownership of land in customary hands will necessarily entail encouraging agriculture at the household and subsistence level. Particular interest in the subsistence agriculture sector has been recognized throughout the Pacific Islands. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) confirms longstanding benefits associated with the return to subsistence agriculture:

Agriculture traditionally played a central role in life in the Pacific -- not only providing food but helping link individuals to their communities and to the land. However, in the context of globalization and related societal changes, including rural-urban migration, fewer young people are pursuing agriculture. At the same time, the region is becoming increasingly reliant on imported food, which has consequences for food security, health and adaptation to climate change. Attracting young people back to agriculture is seen as a way to address high levels of youth unemployment and high reliance on imported food, as well as an opportunity to spur economic development in rural areas.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Secretariat of the Pacific Community (Oct. 2010) “A new look at old ways: Agriculture in the Pacific”, Islands Business Magazine, Suva, available online at: <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2010/October/10-06-ft.htm>, accessed: July 19, 2015

Land reform is therefore antithetical to the fundamental aspects of social and cultural continuity in PNG. We hold the view that there is simply no compromise in this area and that the Vision 2050 is insensitive to the true intentions of the NGDPs. And agriculture by virtue of its mass-based characteristic must be considered first and foremost as the frontline sector in the enhancing of economic and political sovereignty of this country.

Conclusion

In this analysis we conclude that the NGDPs and the visionary thinking of the Constitutional Planning Committee are grossly misinterpreted in the Vision 2050. In the Vision 2050, assessing national development is pinned to non-Papua New Guinean or non-Melanesian worldviews. PNG can take a leaf from Vanuatu's home-grown initiative. Vanuatu has incorporated Melanesian yardsticks in quantifying development. The experience with Vanuatu demonstrates that Melanesian countries have alternative indicators which can also be deployed towards decolonizing the development jargons that obsessively uses international benchmarks "to measure and report development progress across the world" (Brian, 2013).⁴⁸ The role of cultural education and the benefits of culture as tools for development are omitted from any practical strategic considerations in the Vision 2050. For an agrarian society such as PNG, steeped in its cultural heritage, the Vision 2050 does not factor this aspect of PNG into development priorities.

It is also evident from the reading of the PNG Vision 2050 that it promotes an export-oriented outlook. The Constitutional Planning Committee envisaged that unregulated interaction with the global economy is will be detrimental to the political sovereignty of PNG. The Vision 2050 is facilitating a potentially disastrous economic model of development that will see local entrepreneurial capacity inhibited and political sovereignty diminished. Though equalization and broad-based development is suggested in the Vision 2050, the phasing out of the extreme dependence on the mining sector does not have a specific time-frame. We hold the view that the mining sector will continue to compromise the political sovereignty of PNG as long as there are no specific attempts to promptly disengage the mining sector in the economic modelling in PNG. Agriculture must be promoted as a stand-alone sector that must be the front-line sector for true economic and political sovereignty.

And finally a revisitation of the NGDPs must be undertaken as a matter of national priority. The content of PNG's education curriculum must be enriched with the NGDPs to ingrain at an early age the principles and values that should be activated for national development. The NGDPs must become the "philosophy of life" for all Papua New Guineans. Since schools and tertiary institutions are the primary means of preparing citizens for citizenship, the dissemination of the NGDPs in these institutions must be a reality as directed by the Constitutional Planning Committee. The failure of all sectors of PNG to incorporate the NGDPs into the national life of society is the obvious reason why the NGDPs are deliberately misinterpreted in the Vision 2050. An informed citizenry can play a proactive role in critiquing the Vision 2050 against their own understanding of the NGDPs.

⁴⁸ See Derek Brian (2013) "Addressing inequality and promoting inclusive and sustainable development", A speech delivered to the 4th Oceania Development Network biennial conference, 11-12 September 2013 in Suva, Fiji Islands.

Appendix:

Table 1: Top 50 HDI ranking, 2014

HDI Rank	Country	1980	1985	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
..	Very high human development	0.757	0.775	0.798	0.849	0.870	0.874	0.877	0.879	0.880	0.885	0.887	0.889	0.890
..	High human development	0.534	0.552	0.593	0.643	0.682	0.691	0.701	0.710	0.715	0.723	0.729	0.733	0.735
..	Medium human development	0.420	0.448	0.474	0.528	0.565	0.573	0.580	0.587	0.593	0.601	0.609	0.612	0.614
..	Low human development	0.345	0.365	0.367	0.403	0.444	0.456	0.465	0.471	0.478	0.479	0.486	0.490	0.493
1	Norway	0.793	0.814	0.841	0.910	0.935	0.938	0.938	0.937	0.937	0.939	0.941	0.943	0.944
2	Australia	0.841	0.853	0.866	0.898	0.912	0.915	0.918	0.922	0.924	0.926	0.928	0.931	0.933
3	Switzerland	0.806	0.813	0.829	0.886	0.901	0.905	0.905	0.903	0.909	0.915	0.914	0.916	0.917
4	Netherlands	0.783	0.796	0.826	0.874	0.888	0.895	0.901	0.901	0.900	0.904	0.914	0.915	0.915
5	United States	0.825	0.839	0.858	0.883	0.897	0.900	0.903	0.905	0.905	0.908	0.911	0.912	0.914
6	Germany	0.739	0.752	0.782	0.854	0.887	0.896	0.899	0.902	0.901	0.904	0.908	0.911	0.911
7	New Zealand	0.793	0.806	0.821	0.873	0.894	0.896	0.899	0.899	0.903	0.903	0.904	0.908	0.910
8	Canada	0.809	0.822	0.848	0.867	0.892	0.894	0.895	0.896	0.894	0.896	0.900	0.901	0.902
9	Singapore	0.744	0.800	0.840	0.852	0.862	0.868	0.868	0.894	0.896	0.899	0.901
10	Denmark	0.781	0.797	0.806	0.859	0.891	0.893	0.895	0.896	0.895	0.898	0.899	0.900	0.900
11	Ireland	0.734	0.751	0.775	0.862	0.890	0.895	0.901	0.902	0.898	0.899	0.900	0.901	0.899
12	Sweden	0.776	0.786	0.807	0.889	0.887	0.889	0.891	0.891	0.888	0.895	0.896	0.897	0.898
13	Iceland	0.754	0.776	0.800	0.858	0.888	0.890	0.894	0.886	0.885	0.886	0.890	0.893	0.895
14	United Kingdom	0.735	0.747	0.768	0.863	0.888	0.885	0.887	0.890	0.890	0.895	0.891	0.890	0.892
15	Korea (Republic of)	0.628	0.681	0.731	0.819	0.856	0.862	0.869	0.874	0.876	0.882	0.886	0.888	0.891
15	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.698	0.741	0.775	0.810	0.839	0.847	0.860	0.877	0.879	0.882	0.886	0.889	0.891
17	Japan	0.772	0.794	0.817	0.858	0.873	0.877	0.879	0.881	0.880	0.884	0.887	0.888	0.890
18	Liechtenstein	0.882	0.887	0.888	0.889
19	Israel	0.749	0.771	0.785	0.849	0.869	0.872	0.877	0.877	0.878	0.881	0.885	0.886	0.888
20	France	0.722	0.741	0.779	0.848	0.867	0.870	0.873	0.875	0.876	0.879	0.882	0.884	0.884
21	Luxembourg	0.729	0.762	0.786	0.866	0.876	0.877	0.880	0.882	0.876	0.881	0.881	0.880	0.881
21	Belgium	0.753	0.773	0.805	0.873	0.865	0.868	0.871	0.873	0.873	0.877	0.880	0.880	0.881
21	Austria	0.736	0.754	0.786	0.835	0.851	0.857	0.861	0.868	0.870	0.877	0.879	0.880	0.881

HDI Rank	Country	1980	1985	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
24	Finland	0.752	0.771	0.792	0.841	0.869	0.874	0.877	0.878	0.873	0.877	0.879	0.879	0.879
25	Slovenia	0.769	0.821	0.855	0.861	0.865	0.871	0.875	0.873	0.874	0.874	0.874
26	Italy	0.718	0.735	0.763	0.825	0.858	0.863	0.867	0.868	0.866	0.869	0.872	0.872	0.872
27	Spain	0.702	0.724	0.755	0.826	0.844	0.848	0.852	0.857	0.858	0.864	0.868	0.869	0.869
28	Czech Republic	0.762	0.806	0.845	0.848	0.853	0.856	0.856	0.858	0.861	0.861	0.861
29	Greece	0.713	0.739	0.749	0.798	0.853	0.859	0.857	0.858	0.858	0.856	0.854	0.854	0.853
30	Brunei Darussalam	0.740	0.757	0.786	0.822	0.838	0.843	0.844	0.843	0.844	0.844	0.846	0.852	0.852
31	Qatar	0.729	0.753	0.756	0.811	0.840	0.846	0.852	0.855	0.850	0.847	0.843	0.850	0.851
32	Cyprus	0.661	0.696	0.726	0.800	0.828	0.832	0.838	0.844	0.852	0.848	0.850	0.848	0.845
33	Estonia	0.730	0.776	0.821	0.827	0.832	0.832	0.827	0.830	0.836	0.839	0.840
34	Saudi Arabia	0.583	0.623	0.662	0.744	0.773	0.779	0.784	0.791	0.802	0.815	0.825	0.833	0.836
35	Poland	0.687	0.694	0.714	0.784	0.803	0.808	0.812	0.817	0.820	0.826	0.830	0.833	0.834
35	Lithuania	0.737	0.757	0.806	0.814	0.820	0.827	0.833	0.829	0.828	0.831	0.834
37	Slovakia	0.747	0.776	0.803	0.810	0.817	0.824	0.826	0.826	0.827	0.829	0.830
37	Andorra	0.832	0.831	0.830	0.830
39	Malta	0.704	0.717	0.730	0.770	0.801	0.801	0.802	0.809	0.818	0.821	0.823	0.827	0.829
40	United Arab Emirates	0.640	0.686	0.725	0.797	0.823	0.826	0.829	0.832	0.826	0.824	0.824	0.825	0.827
41	Portugal	0.643	0.674	0.708	0.780	0.790	0.794	0.800	0.805	0.809	0.816	0.819	0.822	0.822
41	Chile	0.640	0.664	0.704	0.753	0.785	0.784	0.792	0.805	0.804	0.808	0.815	0.819	0.822
43	Hungary	0.696	0.707	0.701	0.774	0.805	0.810	0.813	0.814	0.816	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.818
44	Cuba	0.681	0.714	0.729	0.742	0.786	0.806	0.822	0.830	0.832	0.824	0.819	0.813	0.815
44	Bahrain	0.677	0.718	0.729	0.784	0.811	0.808	0.809	0.810	0.811	0.812	0.812	0.813	0.815
46	Kuwait	0.702	0.739	0.723	0.804	0.795	0.795	0.797	0.800	0.804	0.807	0.810	0.813	0.814
47	Croatia	0.689	0.748	0.781	0.788	0.796	0.801	0.800	0.806	0.812	0.812	0.812
48	Latvia	0.710	0.729	0.786	0.796	0.804	0.813	0.814	0.809	0.804	0.808	0.810
49	Argentina	0.665	0.688	0.694	0.753	0.758	0.766	0.771	0.777	0.789	0.799	0.804	0.806	0.808
50	Uruguay	0.658	0.661	0.691	0.740	0.755	0.759	0.769	0.773	0.774	0.779	0.783	0.787	0.790

Table 2: Comparisons of 7 Pillars objectives and NGDPs

Vision 2050 Pillar	Pillar's statement of achievable objectives	Directives in the NGDPs
Human Capital Development, Gender, Youth and People Empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train and empower citizens to become powerful forces for development and nation building. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our National Goals and Directive Principles are intended to provide guidance for the full development of our people. People are the common denominators of progress, improvement and development. This is why all social, political, cultural, religious and economic activity should be directed towards the personal liberation and fulfilment of every citizen (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 21) • Making the best use of the talents of our people, in the interests of the nation, is clearly of the highest importance. Particularly at our present stage of development when skills among Papua New Guineans which can usefully be applied to the modern "sector of productive activity are scarce, we need to channel those skills into activities which will most affectively promote the welfare of our people. At the same time, the skills of the people in all kinds of traditional activities should be encouraged and further developed (para 91).
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Widening access and enhancing equity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No particular area or grouping of people should be developed at the expense of another, materially or in other ways. There should always be an equitable distribution and balanced sharing of all the benefits and opportunities the national has to offer. For this type of development to come into being, it is necessary for such conditions to be created and to obtain throughout the nation at all times as to be conducive to that development. Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para.16) • We recognize that people are not born equal either in the talents they possess or in their determination to use them to the best of their ability. But everyone should have an equal chance to develop the talents he or she has whether they be in farming, teaching, the arts, technology or in any other field of human activity. (para.34)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving the quality of teaching and learning. 	<p>Education should be based on and should promote dialogue and co-operation. It should foster integral human development and tolerance among our people, awaken their social conscience, their awareness of the essential dignity of man, and their appreciation of the need to stand up for their rights, both as members of the community and as individuals, in the face of pressures from foreign interests and arbitrary government. It should help to develop a spirit of solidarity of one with another, and an appreciation of our inter-dependence. Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para.27)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing research and innovation. 	<p>We do not take development to be synonymous with material progress. For us the only authentic development is integral human development. This means that we use the term <u>development</u> to mean</p>

		<p>nothing less than the unending process of improvement of every man and woman as a whole person. We take our stand on the dignity and worth of each Papua New Guinean man, woman and child. In effect, this means that integral human development must reach out to and enrich Papua New Guineans in every part of the country.</p> <p>Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para.14)</p>
Wealth Creation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bolster and maintain a strong, dynamic, competitive, and productive economy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In economic development particular emphasis should be placed on small-scale artisan, service and business activity. (NGDP 5 (2). It is clear that our people want economic development, but not just any kind of economic development. Our people are becoming increasingly aware that an obsession with economic development can lead to many harmful consequences; the disruption of traditional systems and values, the alienation of man, the exploitation of the poor by the rich, pollution of the environment and an unjustified depletion of our natural resources.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Downstream processing for fisheries and forestry products. 	<p>The policy of self-reliance means various things: it means self-sufficiency in basic products, but also greater participation by Papua New Guineans in the economy, and an emphasis on small-scale business activity. We believe there is recognition throughout the country of the need for participation by the people in decision-making, and to open channels for the useful employment of the energies and enthusiasm of the people. This is reflected in the emphasis in the "Eight Aims" on decentralisation and the typically Papua New Guinean forms of business activity. Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para.87.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce import of products that can be produced onshore. 	<p>“.....a more self-reliant economy, less dependent for its needs on imported goods and services and better able to meet the needs of its people through local production” (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 7, <i>The relevance of the Eight Improvement Aims</i>)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Citizens to have accessibility to grants/credit/ funding. 	<p><i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create more business opportunities for citizens. 	<p>We believe that there is broad consensus among our people that economic development should not bring about disparities in incomes, either as between individuals or regions. Development above all, must be development of the people. It should be based on our people's own talents and hard work and emphasize Papua New Guinean ways in the manner we have explained earlier in this Chapter. True development is not to be measured by the Gross National Product. The degree to which people throughout the country have the opportunity to achieve personal fulfilment is a much more meaningful measure of a country's development. The total development of all our people, largely through their own efforts, should be our aim.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Empower 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We should not be misunderstood. We are not here urging our

	citizens to be entrepreneurs.	<p>people to become a nation of woodcarvers and banana-taro producers. What we say is that secondary and tertiary industries should be pursued only to supplement and to support our primary industries. Many of our people must, in time, become commercial entrepreneurs, capable of dealing with giant industries. But we should proceed in that direction with caution, and ensure that, in respect of each new large-scale enterprise it is conclusively established that the net benefit of the enterprise to Papua New Guineans as a whole will far exceed the net detriment in terms of our national goals and directive principles and to our human persons (para. 117).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The policy of self-reliance means various things: it means self-sufficiency in basic products, but also greater participation by Papua New Guineans in the economy, and an emphasis on small-scale business activity. We believe there is recognition throughout the country of the need for participation by the people in decision-making, and to open channels for the useful employment of the energies and enthusiasm of the people. This is reflected in the emphasis in the "Eight Aims" on decentralisation and the typically Papua New Guinean forms of business activity. (para. 87)
Institutional Development and Service Delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reform the public service, legal and political systems to be efficient and effective, and improve the delivery of services to all citizens. 	Now is the historic moment in our search for identity and self-fulfilment to take the necessary measures to make substantial changes in all of our institutions, to create new ones and to redirect development when things are fluid and tractable. But for us to know clearly what measures should be taken, our objectives must be clearly established. (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 5)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective legal system. 	Every citizen should have equal and effective access to all governmental services and legal processes. Therefore, strong emphasis should be placed on equalisation of services among different areas of the country. (NGDPs 2, 4)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Private Community Partnership. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>
Security and International Relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Papua New Guinea a safe and peaceful society in the world. 	<p>Foreigners often say, "but there are so many differences. What are the Papua New Guinean ways"? We recognize the legitimacy of this question. However, it betrays a lack of appreciation of what a Papua New Guinean person is. Our ways emphasize egalitarianism and commitment to the community. They recognize the individual as a member of his community. We place great stress on our obligations to our extended families. We share our wealth. We view life in an undivided total picture. These ways of thinking and acting should be encouraged, even in the face of the great emphasis of Western thinking on artificial differentiation between things spiritual or sacred and things physical or profane. (Constitutional Planning Committee Report. Chapter 2, para. 115).</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop robust regional and global cooperation and trade relations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The entry and use of foreign investment capital must be subordinate to the goal of national sovereignty and self-reliance and, in particular, be geared to internal social and economic policies, and to the integrity of the nation and its people. (NGDPs 3 (5)) • We recommend that our people should be encouraged and given greater opportunity, through education, the media and by other means, to increase their awareness of other emerging states. They should then obtain a greater realization of the common problems of developing countries, and fully support the participation of our government in joint international measures aimed at strengthening the solidarity of these states in the fight for "the establishment of a new international economic order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence and co-operation to ensure economic and social development in peace and justice for present and future generations" in all countries, including our own. (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 30) • Development must take place through our people. It must be a process. It must not be a prefabricated, predetermined set of answers, formulae and solutions by foreigners to the problems and hopes we alone can feel and yearn for. Technology, scientific discoveries and institutions of the most recent times can, in many respects, be inappropriate for us. Proper development should take place through institutions and techniques that are not only meaningful to us, but also recognize our human dignity and enhance it.(para 102)
Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable development measures developed in all sectors to increase resilience to the impacts of climate change and environmental changes. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conserve and use our natural resources and environment for the collective benefit and for future generations. 	The natural resources including land, forests, birds, animals, fish, water, sea, air and minerals should be used wisely in the interest of the integral development of all citizens throughout Papua New Guinea. (NGDPs 4, (1))
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve understanding on environmental sustainability and climate change with educational awareness on economic opportunities, such as 	Making the best use of the talents of our people, in the interests of the nation, is clearly of the highest importance. Particularly at our present stage of development when skills among Papua New Guineans which can usefully be applied to the modern "sector of productive activity are scarce, we need to channel those skills into activities which will most affectively promote the welfare of our people. At the same time, the skills of the people in all kinds of traditional activities should be encouraged and further developed. (NGDPs 4, 91)

	carbon trade and tourism.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Converse and wisely use our natural resources and environment, language and cultural diversity for the collective benefit of the present and future generation. 	The basic concept in our society with regard to use of natural resources is that one generation holds and uses resources in the capacity of trustee for future generations. We, the generation of today, cannot squander our country's resources. We would clearly be failing in our responsibility if we sold our resources to foreigners for our own short term benefit, without regard to the needs of generations after us. (NGDPs 4 (90) (2))
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective partnership and cooperation with international community on environmental sustainability and climate issue. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>
Spiritual, Cultural and Community Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Instill positive attitudes and values of respect, integrity, excellence, and discipline in people. 	It is possible, however, for a Constitution to contribute to the direction taken by the people and their government. To the extent that this is practicable, we have tried, in our recommendations, to facilitate the implementation of the Directive Principles in this Chapter, which, in turn, are aimed at promoting the achievement of the National Goals. Thus, our recommendation that all activities of the State and its institutions should be based on the Directive Principles and directed towards achieving the National Goals is designed to help to reorient the thinking and attitudes of everyone who is a member of an elected body or who works in a government department, institution or authority; and to redirect the policies of those bodies towards the Goals. (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 122)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involve the churches and NGOs as equal partners in development and service delivery. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop love for God, citizens, foreigners, work, creation, and property. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve and increase chaplaincy services to Parliament, all security forces, and all government institutions. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGOs and churches as equal partners in development and service delivery. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>
Strategic Planning, Integration and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sound strategic direction for development and nation building. 	We have recommended also that the Government (and here we mean all levels of government - national, provincial and local) and all institutions of government (including the universities and other educational or statutory bodies) should make specific reference to the goals and principles indicating their relevance to national policies and programs such as the Development Plan and the Budget. Already this is being done to some extent in relation to the Eight Aims. Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 128
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational cascade vision and mission statement. 	We have recommended also that the Government (and here we mean all levels of government - national, provincial and local) and all institutions of government (including the universities and other educational or statutory bodies) should make specific reference to the goals and principles indicating their relevance to national policies and programs such as the Development Plan and the Budget. Already this is being done to some extent in relation to the Eight Aims (Constitutional Planning Committee Report, Chapter 2, para. 128)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor and evaluate implementation of Vision 2050. 	<i>No parallels in the NGDPs</i>

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